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Deputy Chief Mowry's public statement that the patrolmen ought not to have arrested the boys. The confidence of various groups in society in the fairness of the police is of course the key to public cooperation.

The incident also illustrates the value of a police community relations division under an able and forthright officer like Chief Mowry. It was his first test in a highly demanding job, and he deserves the community's confidence. Washington's Metropolitan Police constitute one of the most efficient forces in the country. It is now showing that it understands the value of restraint and tact as well.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, both Deputy Chief Mowry and Inspector Causey have been captains of the 14th precinct and are good tacticians in community relations work and because of this, enjoy the respect of every segment of the committee.

I would hope and expect, and I am sure many of my colleagues would agree, that they will get the fullest cooperation in their endeavors for I am certain the community will be far better off for their efforts.

It is both interesting and pleasing for me to note that Howard Mowry comes from an old and much respected Rhode Island family. So I take this opportunity to wish him well in his new position and to reiterate my interest and hope for a vigorous effort against crime by those who are charged with the responsibility of law enforcement in the District of Columbia.

WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMAN?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, for some time it has been the proud boast of the managers of America's space effort that unlike the Soviets, our experiments are conducted in full view of the public. This, it has been asserted, is characteristic of the differences in our form of government and the closed society of the Communist world.

Now, a dark cloud has been cast on that claim. Assertions of censorship and news management have been made by the respected science writer of the Washington Evening Star, William Hines.

Some of the clumsy attempts at censorship are both silly and stupid.

But, more importantly, they seriously undermine not only this Nation's confidence, but that of the world, in our ability and determination to tell the

truth of the damaged areas. I was told they were "not available." I asked why U.S. television networks were carrying films by Vietcong photographers but were seemingly unable to obtain footage showing the effects of our raids. There was no explanation.

And now there are distressing signals that the space program is falling prey to the same dread disease of secrecy.

It would be my hope, Mr. President, that the communications media themselves, which argue so eloquently for the freedom of the press which our Constitution guarantees them, would increase their protests against news management and censorship.

Mr. Hines has done a great service both to his craft and to the public in his article which appeared in the September 1 issue of the Star. I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Sept. 1, 1965]

WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMAN?

(By William Hines)

The Pentagon has surprised almost everyone with its promptness in applying the first squeeze of censorship and news management to its new manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) program.

Most people assumed that soon after the military got a manned role in space, it would start classifying it, but few could have foreseen the rapidity with which restrictions came. The elapsed time from President Johnson's announcement of the start of MOL at his press conference last week to the Pentagon's first fumbling bit of news management was exactly 2 hours.

The restriction was picayune and worse than pointless: It was unenforceable.

Reporters trooping to an MOL briefing at the Pentagon were instructed that they would not be allowed to make tape recordings or to mention the name of the official (Dr. Albert C. Hall, Deputy Director of Research and Engineering), who was briefing them. This exchange then occurred:

"Why not?"

"Because that's the way we prefer to do it."

The briefing was highly technical and contained many points that could be misunderstood by reporters and thus misinterpreted for readers who, in the final analysis, will be paying the expensive tab for MOL. A tape would have been helpful.

The briefing was later transmitted by telephone to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Houston Center, where a large contingent of reporters was covering the flight of Gemini 5.

traducer of a free news flow. The space agency gives news management the old college try every time a manned spacecraft goes up.

Of all the significant news locations in a Gemini flight, the only one not covered by the combined news media (meaning press, radio, and TV) is the most important one of all, the mission control center at Houston.

It is not a secret place, nor one in which unnecessary traffic is discouraged. Flight Director Christopher C. Kraft already has stated publicly that he would rather have a Soviet observer in his control center than an American journalist. Further, every clerk and secretary among the 4,600 NASA civil servants who could spare 5 or 10 minutes from work was encouraged to look in.

On one flight the motion picture actor Jimmy Stewart was an interested observer. Even newspaper publishers have been admitted, possibly on the theory that they are not really "working press," and hence harmless.

But neither camera nor tape recorder nor pen-and-paper reporter is allowed in the nonsecret room at any time during a flight. This is a measure of how far we have come in 20 short years. Even in the supersecret atom bomb project, the national press had a "pool" representative, William L. Laurence of the New York Times. This is not to suggest that there has been any "coverup" to date. In the course of missions, Kraft gives regular, full, and apparently frank accounts of flight activities, and opens himself to detailed questioning. So do his associates. A mission commentary of less consistent accuracy and authenticity is broadcast.

But whether or not there has been suppression to date is not the point. All flights so far have ended happily, and nothing succeeds like success. There has been no reason for a coverup.

The point is that the opportunity for news management definitely exists in mission control—and it is an axiom of political science that where opportunity exists, there are always people waiting to seize it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SCENIC DEVELOPMENT AND ROAD BEAUTIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY SYSTEMS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2084) to provide for scenic development

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On page 12, lines 1 and 2, after the word "pay" in line 1 strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of".

On page 16, line 15, after the word "pay" strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of the".

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would like to explain the purpose of the amendment which I have offered for myself and the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF]. The committee bill provides that the cost shall be allocated between the Federal Government and the States in the same proportion that costs are allocated for construction of the Interstate Highway and primary systems—that is, 90 percent to be paid by the Federal Government and 10 percent by the States, in respect to the Interstate Highway System, and 50 percent by the Federal Government and 50 percent by the States with respect to the primary system.

I support the objectives of the bill, and voted to report it to the Senate. But yesterday, at the close of the session, I stated my reasons for having presented this amendment in committee, and the reasons which lead me to offer it today.

In the subcommittee this amendment was adopted by a large vote, but in the full committee the action of the subcommittee was reversed by a vote of 8 to 5.

I offer this amendment for two principal reasons. One reason is that it is a national program. It is so declared by the bill and by the President.

The second reason for requiring the full amount to be paid by the Federal Government is that the bill would impose a penalty upon States not acceding to its program—the penalty being the denial of all Federal-aid funds for construction of highways. With such a penalty, and no State could accept such a penalty, the program proposed in the bill—worthy as it is—cannot be considered a true voluntary Federal-State aid program. The denial of all funds to a State would amount to millions of dollars to a State.

In the case of California it would amount to a denial of \$336 million annually. In my own State it would amount to \$74 million. In other States it would be in similar proportions.

The bill would effectually require the States to accept this program and that their legislatures appropriate money to pay for its cost. It is a worthy program. I voted to report it to the Senate, but I do not approve its mandatory features.

Over 100 Federal-aid programs have been enacted. None mandatorily requires State acceptance. If it is to be exercised, I believe the Federal Government should pay its full cost.

I understand there are others who desire to speak. I shall not speak further at this time.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I concur in this amendment for all of the reasons outlined. This is a coercive program.

We are saying to the States that they have to go into the secondary road system where always we have had the pro-

vision that billboards were permitted. We are saying to them that they must remove billboards on the 50-50 allocation that has always been proposed.

There is a difference in the Interstate System, which is new, which goes through new areas and new territory. We say that under the law we will give the same proportion of assistance to the State to remove billboards that we gave for the financing of other highway systems, such as under the 90-10 Interstate System.

So far as the secondary systems are concerned, we have always had the right to erect billboards. This is a prevailing system in all the States. Yet, we are saying to the States that they must remove the billboards or they will not be permitted to share in the Federal highway program. It is coercion.

We are taking away from the States their police power to remove billboards and we are saying they have to make compensation.

This is a national program. We have decided we are going to remove billboards from the interstate and secondary systems. Therefore, I concur that we should pay that cost out of the national budget. We should not force the States to forgo all of their participation in the interstate program if they do not want to take away a man's livelihood, or a man's business, which he has had for many years.

I feel strongly that the States should use their funds for secondary road systems and the farm-to-market roads, and for the development of primary highways on the present allocation, and should not be forced to compensate the billboard operators. I feel strongly that the cost should come out of the Federal budget.

Therefore, I concur in the amendment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, even though the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], will not be germane to the pending legislation (S. 2084), I ask unanimous consent that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Senator FULBRIGHT] be allowed to speak for not to exceed 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Young of Ohio in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered. The rule of germaneness is waived.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not intend to object, but I wish to have the assurance that the amendment which has been stated will be the pending question at the conclusion of the remarks by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair states to the senior Senator from Kentucky that his amendment will be the pending question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the formation of a provisional government in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news. It provides reason for cautious optimism as to the future and testifies as well to the arduous and patient efforts of the OAS mediating team. I wish to pay tribute especially to Ambassador Bunker for his wisdom and patience in handling this difficult affair. The formation of a provisional government is not the end of the Dominican crisis, but it does bring to an end a tragic and dangerous phase of the crisis. Many problems remain, particularly the problem of establishing the authority of a democratic government over the Dominican military. Nonetheless, the situation now seems to be moving into a less dangerous and more hopeful phase. At this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future.

I was in doubt about the advisability of making a statement on the Dominican affair until some of my colleagues made public statements on the floor. Their views on the way in which the committee proceedings were conducted and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as a whole, are so diametrically opposed to my own that I now consider it my duty to express my personal conclusions drawn from the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The suggestions that have been made that the committee was prejudiced in its approach against the administration's policies are, in my opinion, without merit. The committee was impartial and fair in giving a full and detailed hearing to the administration's point of view, so much so, in fact, that it heard only one witness from outside the Government.

U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor.

These are general conclusions I have reached from a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation. These judgments are made, of course, with the benefit of hindsight and, in fairness, it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task

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of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis.

It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently. What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events. The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement in the initial stages and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is of critical importance and I shall comment on it later. The essential point, however, is that the United States, on the basis of ambiguous evidence, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the United States could also attempt to influence the course which the revolution took. We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin America by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support. We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo—and the status quo in many countries is not good enough.

The principal reason for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo was faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis. Much of this advice was based on misjudgment of the facts of the situation; some of it appears to have been based on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, simply inaccurate information. On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did.

I am hopeful, and reasonably confident, that the mistakes made by the United States in the Dominican Republic can be retrieved and that it will be possible to avoid repeating them in the future. These purposes can be served, however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. policy are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. I make my remarks today in the hope of contributing to that process.

The development of the Dominican crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, provides a classic study of policymaking in a fast-changing situation in which each decision reduces the range of options available for future decisions so that errors are compounded and finally, indeed, there are few if any options except to follow through on an ill-conceived course of action. Beyond a certain point the Dominican story acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.

Another theme that emerges from the Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a striking change in U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and the possibility—not a certainty, because the signs are ambiguous, but only the possibility—of a major change as well in the general Latin American policies of the United States. Obviously, an important change in the official outlook on Dominican affairs occurred between September 1963, when the United States was vigorously opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and April 1965, when the United States was either unenthusiastic or actually opposed to his return.

What happened in that period to change the assessment of Bosch from favorable to unfavorable? It is quite true that Bosch as President did not distinguish himself as an administrator, but that was well known in 1963. It is also true, however, and much more to the point as far as the legitimate interests of the United States are concerned, that Bosch had received 58 percent of the votes in a free and honest election and that he was presiding over a reform-minded government in tune with the Alliance for Progress. This is a great deal more than can be said for any other President of the Dominican Republic.

The question therefore remains as to how and why the attitude of the U.S. Government changed so strikingly between September 1963 and April 1965. And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the U.S. Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America—such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela—as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?

I should like to make it very clear that I am raising a question not offering an answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the current attitude of the U.S. Government toward reformist movements in Latin America. On the one hand, President Johnson's deep personal commitment to the philosophy and aims of the Alliance for Progress is clear; it was convincingly expressed, for example, in his speech to the Latin American Ambassadors on the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress—a statement in which the President compared the Alliance for Progress with his own enlightened program for a Great Society at home. On the other hand, one notes a general tendency on the part of our policymakers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anticommunism. One also notes in certain Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with counterinsurgency, which is to say, with the prospect of revolutions and means of suppressing them. This preoccupation is manifested in dubious and costly research projects,

such as the recently discredited Camelot; these studies claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias.

It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved. We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do. The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. The prospect of an election in 9 months which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government is certainly reassuring on this score, but the fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution which, had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention. Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events in the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable; and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Our heritage of stability and conservatism is a great blessing, but it also has the effect of limiting our understanding of the character of social revolution and sometimes as well of the injustices which spawn them. Our understanding of revolutions and their causes is imperfect not because of any failures of mind or character but because of our good fortune since the Civil War in never having experienced sustained social injustice without hope of legal or more or less peaceful remedy. We are called upon, therefore, to give our understanding and our sympathy and support to movements

which are alien to our experience and jarring to our preferences and prejudices.

We must try to understand social revolution and the injustices that give it rise because they are the heart and core of the experience of the great majority of people now living in the world. In Latin America we may prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessmen who often hold positions of power, but Latin American reformers regard such men as aliens in their own countries who neither identify with their own people nor even sympathize with their aspirations. Such leaders are regarded by educated young Latin Americans as a "consular bourgeoisie," by which they mean business-oriented conservatives who more nearly represent the interests of foreign businessmen than the interests of their own people. Men like Donald Reid—who is one of the better of this category of leaders—may have their merits, but they are not the force of the future in Latin America.

It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left who have most of the popular support in Latin America. The Radical Party in Chile, for example, is full of 19th century libertarians whom many North Americans would find highly congenial, but it was recently crushed in national elections by a group of rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats. It may be argued that the Christian Democrats are anti-United States, and to a considerable extent some of them are—more so now, it may be noted, than prior to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic—but they are not Communists and they have popular support. They have also come to terms with the American copper companies in Chile; that is something which the predecessor conservative government was unable to do and something which a Communist government would have been unwilling to do.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Chile.

In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, I commented as follows on the prospect of revolution:

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fall in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future. I turn now to comment on some of the events which began last April 24 in Santo Domingo.

When the Dominican revolution began on Saturday, April 24, the United States had there options available. First, it could have supported the Reid Cabral government; second, it could have supported the revolutionary forces; and third, it could do nothing.

The administration chose the last course. When Donald Reid Cabral asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25, he was given no encouragement. He then resigned, and considerable disagreement ensued over the nature of the government to succeed him. The party of Juan Bosch, the PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the transfer of government power but was given no encouragement. Thus, there began at that time a chaotic situation which amounted to civil war in a country without an effective government.

What happened in essence was that the Dominican military refused to support Reid and were equally opposed to Bosch or other PRD leaders as his successor. The PRD, which had the support of some military officers, announced that Rafael Molina Urena, who had been President of the Senate during the Bosch regime, would govern as Provisional President pending Bosch's return. At this point, the military leaders delivered an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25 the air force and navy began firing at the National Palace. Later in the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Embassy to use its influence to persuade the air force to stop the attacks. The Embassy made it clear it would not intervene on behalf of the rebels, although on the following day, Monday, April 26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did not the United States offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "U.S. presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and un-

willing to support if not positively opposed to Bosch.

Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why U.S. attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and Caamaño Deno, called at the U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist, forces. Ambassador Bennett, who had been instructed four times to work for a cease fire and for the formation of a military junta, felt he did not have authority to mediate; mediation, in his view, would have been "intervention." Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and without massive military intervention. Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the marines, and as we know some 20,000 soldiers were landed—American soldiers.

On the afternoon of April 27 General Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte bridge into the city of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt themselves rebuffed at the American Embassy, some of their leaders, including Molina Urena, sought asylum in Latin American embassies in Santo Domingo. The administration has interpreted this as evidence that the non-Communist rebels recognized growing Communist influence in their movement and were consequently abandoning the revolution. Molina Urena has said simply that he sought asylum because he thought the revolutionary cause hopeless.

An opportunity was lost on April 27. Ambassador Bennett was in a position to bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution, but he chose not to do so on the ground that the exercise of his good offices at that point would have constituted intervention. In the words of Washington Post Writer Murrey Marder—one of the press people who, to the best of my knowledge, has not been assailed as prejudiced:

It can be argued with considerable weight that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States threw away a fateful opportunity to try to prevent the sequence that produced the American intervention. It allowed the relatively leaderless revolt to pass into hands which it was to allege were Communist.¹

The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were

¹ Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E3.

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dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the anti-rebel forces which no one, including the U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves, anticipated, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the antirebels under Air Force General de los Santos be furnished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The antirebels themselves asked for armed U.S. intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the antirebels in particular. In mid-afternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

It was at this point, on April 28, that events acquired something of the predestiny of a Greek tragedy. Subsequent events—the failure of the missions of John Bartlow Martin and McGeorge Bundy, the conversion of the U.S. force into an inter-American force, the enforced stalemate between the rebels under Caamano Deno and the Imbert junta, the OAS mediation and the tortuous negotiations for a provisional government—have all been widely reported and were not fully explored in the committee hearings. In any case, the general direction of events was largely determined by the fateful decision of April 28. Once the Marines landed on that day, and especially after they were heavily reinforced in the days immediately following, the die was cast and the United States found itself deeply involved in the Dominican civil conflict, with no visible way to extricate itself, and with its hemisphere relations complicated in a way that few could have foreseen and no one could have desired.

The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28. In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Do-

mingo until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in the last days of April 1965. There was fighting in the streets, aircraft were strafing parts of the city, and there was indiscriminate shooting. I think that the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island. Had such a force been landed and then promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, I do not think that any fair-minded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities.

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is therefore crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed, there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The administration, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist-dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion.

It is, perhaps, understandable that administration officials should have felt some sense of panic; after all, the Foreign Service officer who had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power has had his career ruined by congressional committees. Furthermore, even without this consideration, the decisions regarding the Dominican Republic had to

be made under great pressure and on the basis of inconclusive information. In charity, this can be accepted as a reason why the decisions were mistaken; but it does not change the conclusion that they were mistaken.

The point I am making is not—emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ. The burden of proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control.

Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake in my opinion which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term "Communist" very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into supporting their selfish and discredited aims.

If the United States had really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not a strictly legal right to do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten. But the United States did not intervene primarily to save American lives; it intervened to prevent what it conceived to be a Communist takeover. That meant, in the terms in which the United States defined the situation, that it was intervening against the rebels, who, however heavily they might or might not have been infiltrated by Communists, were also the advocates of the restoration of a freely elected constitutional government which had been forcibly overthrown. It also meant that the United States was intervening for the military and the oligarchy—to the detriment of the Dominican people and to the bitter disappointment of those throughout Latin America who had placed their hopes in the United States and the Alliance for Progress.

On the basis of the record, there is ample justification for concluding that, at least from the time Reid resigned, U.S.

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policy was directed toward construction of a military junta which hopefully would restore peace and conduct free elections. That is to say that U.S. policy was directed against the return of Bosch and against the success of the rebel movement.

In this connection it is interesting to recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he was in power in the Dominican Republic between February and September of 1963. He had been elected, as I have already mentioned, in the only free and honest election ever held in the Dominican Republic, in December 1962, with 58 percent of the votes cast.

The United States placed such importance on his success that President Kennedy sent the then Vice President Johnson and Senator Humphrey, among others, to attend his inauguration in February 1963. In September 1963, when he was overthrown in a military coup, the United States made strenuous efforts—which stopped just short of sending the Marines—to keep him in power and thereafter the United States waited almost 3 months before recognizing the successor government. Recognition came, by the way, only after the successor government had conducted military operations against a band of alleged Communist guerrillas in the mountains, and there is a suspicion that the extent of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated by the successor government in order to secure U.S. recognition.

It may be granted that Bosch was no great success as President of the Dominican Republic but, when all his faults have been listed, the fact remains that Bosch was the only freely elected President in Dominican history, the only President who had ever tried, however ineptly, to give the country a decent government, and the only President who was unquestionably in tune with the Alliance for Progress.

Despite these considerations, the United States was at the very least unenthusiastic or, more probably, opposed to Bosch's return to power in April 1965. Bosch himself was apparently not eager to return—he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return to the Dominican Republic. In any case, he missed a critical opportunity. But the United States was equally adamant against a return to power of Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the nearest thing to a mass-based, well-organized party that has ever existed in the Dominican Republic. The stated reason was that a PRD government would be Communist dominated.

This might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened. We based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood. Obviously, if we based all our policies on the mere possibility of communism, then we would have to set ourselves against just about every progressive political movement in the world, because almost all such movements are subject to at least the theoretical danger of Communist takeover. This approach is not in the

national interest; foreign policy must be based on prospects that seem probable, hopeful and susceptible to constructive influence rather than on merely possible dangers.

One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change. The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo, in the probably vain hope that these forces could be induced to permit at least some reform and social change, the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won.

How vain the hopes of U.S. policymakers were is amply demonstrated by events since April 28. The junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved quite intractable and indeed filled the airwaves daily with denunciations of the United States and the Organization of American States for preventing it from wiping out the Communist rebels. These are the same military forces which on April 28 were refusing to fight the rebels and begging for U.S. intervention. Our aim apparently was to use Imbert as a counterpoise to Caamano Dero in the ill-founded hope that non-Communist liberals would be drawn away from the rebel side.

In practice, instead of Imbert becoming in our tractable instrument, we, to a certain extent, became his: he clung tenaciously to the power we gave him and was at least as intransigent as the rebels in the protracted negotiations for a provisional government.

The resignation of Imbert and his junta provides grounds for hope that a strong popular government may come to power in the Dominican Republic, but that hope must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power in Dominican politics—power which it probably would not now have if the United States had not intervened to save it from defeat last April 28. Even with a provisional government installed in Santo Domingo, and with the prospect of an election in 9 months, there remains the basic problem of a deep and widespread demand for social change. The prospect for such social change is circumscribed by the fact that the military has not surrendered and cannot be expected voluntarily to surrender its entrenched position of privilege and outrageous corruption.

The United States has grossly underestimated the symbolism of the Bosch constitution of 1963. It can be argued that this contains unrealistic promises, but it has stirred the hopes and idealism of the Dominican people. The real objections to it, the part of conservative Dominicans, seem to be that it provides for separation of church and state and that it provides that Dominican citizens have the right to live in the Dominican Republic if they so desire—that is, that Dominican citizens who happen also to be Communists cannot be deported. In passing, one may note a similarity to the U.S. Constitution on both of these points.

The United States has also misread the dedication of the Dominican military to the status quo and to its own powers and privileges. It may be said that the United States has overestimated its ability to influence the military while failing to use to the fullest the influence it does have.

The act of United States massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a grievous mistake, but if one is going to cross the bridge of intervention, with all of the historical ghosts which it calls forth throughout Latin America, then one might as well cross all the way and not stop in the middle. It is too late for the United States to refrain from intervention; it is not too late to try to redeem some permanent benefit from that intervention. Specifically, I think that the influence of the United States and the Organization of American States should be used to help the Dominican people free themselves from the oppressive weight of a corrupt and privileged military establishment. It is entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it just as it has done in the past. The OAS mediating team made a contribution by bringing about the installation of a provisional government; the OAS can still make a solid contribution to Dominican democracy by urging or insisting that as part of a permanent solution the Dominican military establishment be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals be pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad. If the United States and the OAS are going to impose a solution in the Dominican Republic, they might as well impose a good solution as a bad one.

Since preparing these remarks, I note in this morning's press that General Wessin has been induced to leave the Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a step in the right direction.

The Foreign Relations Committee's study of the Dominican crisis leads me to draw certain specific conclusions regarding American policy in the Dominican Republic and also suggests some broader considerations regarding relations between the United States and Latin America. My specific conclusions regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo are as follows:

First. The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land thousands of marines on April 28 was based primarily on the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

Second. This fear was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. There is no doubt that Communists participated in the Dominican revolution on the rebel side, probably to a greater extent after than before the landing of U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it cannot be proved that the Communists would not have taken over the revolu-

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tion neither can it be proved that they would have. There is little basis in the evidence offered the committee for the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so; on the contrary, the evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to influence the shape and course of the rebellion.

Third. The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events. The best opportunities were on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, requested a "United States presence," and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested United States mediation for a negotiated settlement. Both requests were rejected, in the first instance for reasons that are not entirely clear but probably because of United States hostility to the PRD, in the second instance because the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces.

Fourth. U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September 1963 and April 1965. In 1963, the United States strongly supported Bosch and the PRD as enlightened reformers; in 1965 the United States opposed their return to power on the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch or PRD government would certainly, or almost certainly, become Communist dominated. Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy.

Fifth. U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation. The former is illustrated by official assertions that U.S. military intervention was primarily for the purpose of saving American lives; the latter is illustrated by exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels—reports which no one has been able to verify. It was officially asserted, for example—by the President in a press conference on June 17 according to an official State Department bulletin—that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is no evidence to support this statement. A sober examination of such evidence as is available indicates that the Imbert junta was guilty of at least as many atrocities as the rebels.

Sixth. Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28, these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended U.S. massive military intervention. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such advice, the President made the decisions that he made.

Seventh. Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of another Cuba. The specter of a second Communist state in the

Western Hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

I turn now to some broader and long-term implications of the Dominican tragedy, first to some considerations relating to the Organization of American States and its charter, then to the problem of reaction and revolution in Latin America, finally to a suggestion for a freer and, I believe, healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that:

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.

Article 17 states that:

The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American States. It may be that we should never have accepted this commitment at Bogotá in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the obsolescence of the principle of nonintervention that some U.S. officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments embodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law but who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interest. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political in-

dependence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking article 6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to consult—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would advising them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

It is possible, had we undertaken such consultations, that our Latin American partners would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is another important reason for compliance with the law. The United States is a conservative power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. A great conference is taking place here in Washington this week on the subject, World Peace Through Law. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we

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violate the law ourselves, whatever short term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long term interests.

There are those who defend U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of nonintervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsolescence justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the Charter. Second, the view that the principle of nonintervention is obsolete is one held by certain U.S. officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provided them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed participate in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered intervention. The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about everybody, including the Communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship to good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of nonintervention; however obsolete it may seem to certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere letter of the law; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

The inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs they have accepted a role as members of our "sphere" and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies. In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs.

In the eyes of educated, energetic and patriotic young Latin Americans—which is to say, the generation that will make or break the Alliance for Progress—the United States committed a worse offense in the Dominican Republic than just intervention; it intervened against social revolution and in support, at least temporarily, of a corrupt, reactionary military oligarchy.

It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the United States on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. Nor am I reassured by assertions on the part of administration officials that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our actions in the Dominican Republic while explaining that of course they could not be expected to support us openly. Why cannot they support us openly, unless it is because their sympathy does not represent the views of their own people and they do not dare to express it openly? In fact, real enthusiasm for our Dominican venture has been confined largely to military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run. Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America. These, broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and social democrats in a number of countries, the APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere. By our intervention on the side of a corrupt military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the democratic reformers who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States. We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction.

If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make: they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies.

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principle threats to that aspiration—reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its Dominican actions the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolu-

tions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. marines across barricades in their own home towns.

I, myself, am sure, as I know President Johnson and, indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America. We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a doctrine for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

We know this ourselves but it remains to convince our true friends in Latin America that their social revolutions will have our sympathy and support. It will not be easy to do so, because our intervention in Santo Domingo shook if it did not shatter a confidence in the United States that had been built up over 30 years since the liquidation of the Caribbean protectorates and the initiation of the "good neighbor policy."

It will be difficult but it can be done. President Johnson took a positive step on the long road back in his statement of rededication to the Alliance for Progress to the Latin American Ambassadors on August 17. It remains for us to eliminate the ambiguity between the anti-revolutionary approach symbolized by Project Camelot and the preoccupation with problems of counterinsurgency on the one hand and the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress on the other. If we do this—and I am both sure that we can and reasonably hopeful that we will—then I think that the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In conclusion, I suggest that a new and healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America must be a freer relationship than that of the past.

The United States is a world power with world responsibilities and to it the inter-American system represents a sensible way of maintaining law and order in the region closest to the United States. To the extent that it functions as we want it to function, one of the inter-American system's important advantages is that it stabilizes relations within the western hemisphere and thus frees the United States to act on its worldwide responsibilities.

To Latin Americans, on the other hand, the inter-American system is politically and psychologically confining. It has the effect, so to speak, of cooping them up in the western hemisphere, giving them the feeling that there is no way to break out of the usually well-intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States. In their hearts, I have no doubt, most Latin Americans would like to be free of us, just as a son or daughter coming of age wishes to be free of an over-protective parent. A great many of those Latin Americans for

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whom Castro still has some appeal—and there are now more, I would guess, than before last April 28—are attracted not, I feel, because they are infatuated with communism, but because Cuba, albeit at the price of almost complete dependency on the Soviet Union, has broken out of the orbit of the United States.

It is the nature of things that small nations do not live comfortably in the shadow of large and powerful nations, regardless of whether the latter are benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that, despite the Communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just common sense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

President Frei of Chile has taken an initiative to this end. He has visited European leaders and apparently indicated that his Christian Democratic Government is interested in establishing new political, economic, and cultural links with European countries. For the reasons suggested, I think this is an intelligent and constructive step.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the western hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the Communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free, stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should like to express my complete accord with the position taken by the Senator in his most interesting and very important speech about the Dominican Republic and the events which have taken place there.

It has been my privilege as a junior member of the Committee on Foreign Relations to sit through most of the hearings which have been held on the Dominican Republic and to read that part of the testimony which I did not actually hear.

I believe that this speech is overdue, sound, and wise. I hope that it will be given great effect by the policymakers of the executive branch of our Government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his comment.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is certainly entitled to his opinion with regard to the action of the President of the United States, as are all Senators. However, I should like to say as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I do not believe the Senator from Arkansas' remarks reflect the sentiment of that committee on this matter. The members of the committee were invited by the President to give him advice on the decision to send American troops to the Dominican Republic. That is true of the distinguished chairman of the committee also. When that decision was made, not one dissenting voice was heard. The Senator was there. He had an opportunity to advise the President about what should be done. I believe his advice was taken on that occasion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is mistaken. We were not asked as to what action should be taken. We were told what had been done. As far as we knew, it had been done.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is not my impression. My impression is that the Senator attended the meeting at the White House. He was there. I know I was there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was there.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Not one American marine had been landed up to that time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the decision had been made.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not going to quote the Senator because that was a secret meeting and much secret information was discussed.

My understanding was that the President—and I say this with regard to our Republican friends also—said certain things to indicate that he did not want to act until he had consulted with us; and the decision had not been made.

My impression of the matter was that the Senator from Arkansas made a suggestion of what should be done. He can use his best judgment on the protocol about matters of that sort. But my impression was, insofar as the Senator's suggestion, was concerned that it was followed.

So far as I am concerned, this was simply a matter of whether this country was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban type Communist takeover, or whether we were going to move on the theory that this looked very much as though it might be a Communist takeover, and that we would rather take the chance of moving when it might not be necessary, than take the risk—as President Eisenhower did—that this would be a Communist takeover.

We have information now that the Communists in the Dominican Republic are stronger than Castro was when he started out to take Cuba.

We have information, available to the Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to believe there is a real threat of Communist subjugation and conquest of that island. That we do not wish to see take place.

I have heard some criticism of the fact that the President sent more troops than were necessary. In Louisiana we had some contact with this type of problem.

I recall a time, while my father was a prominent official in Louisiana government, when some people who could not win an election decided to take charge and organized an army at the airport. The National Guard arrived and the only fellow who was injured was a man who shot himself with his own shotgun trying to get through a barbed wire fence.

At another time, in the city of New Orleans, when the police force was under control of the existing organization, which was opposed to our group and would not assure our faction an honest election count, we called out the National Guard. After awhile we agreed on a procedure to assure a fair election and we took out the National Guard. We got an honest count.

On both occasions the man in charge of the troops did not have to shoot anybody, but he said:

The best way to be sure you do not have to fight is to have enough troops there so the opposition will know that they cannot defeat you if there is to be fighting.

That would be my advice to the President. "Do not send 200 or 300 marines and have them exterminated. Send enough boys so that if there is a fight, and the opposition will know that if they start a fight, they will be defeated."

The Senator had a different idea than I did in regard to the Bay of Pigs. My thought about the Bay of Pigs was that the idea of helping people to go there and liberating that island was not a bad idea. The only thing was that we did not send enough people to whip Castro.

If that were to have been done, that would have been the time to do it, in my judgment. Many people would like to be free of Castro's enslavement on that island. If the general philosophy of the Senator's speech had been followed, Castro would have taken not only that island, but the Dominican Republic, also.

If we follow the general view that if the Communists attempt to take over, we ought to do what is within our power to keep that from happening, not only would we not have lost the Dominican

Republic to the Communists; we would never have lost Cuba to the Communists.

Suppose President Eisenhower had it to do all over again, and he had heard one group argue the Fulbright doctrine: "Do not interfere; you might be criticized"; and another group saying, "This is a Communist takeover; go on in." Suppose President Eisenhower, sincere, anti-Communist, and good man that he is, had been confronted with such a situation again.

I believe he would not have taken a chance that there would be a Communist takeover. He would have gone in. He would have resolved the doubt in an effort to try to save the people from Communist subjugation.

So far as I know—and I believe this is correct—every responsible person who had any contact with the matter urged the President to do what he did; and the President proceeded to do what he thought was best, after explaining the problem as he saw it. He invited everyone, including the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], to offer advice. I had the opportunity to offer my advice. My advice was: "If you have any thought whatever that this might be a Communist takeover, please, Mr. President, move, because the American people will never forgive you if you merely sit here and watch the Communists take that island."

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. I want to associate myself with the remarks just made by the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. I am one of those who was privileged to sit in on the particular meeting that has been referred to. There were many there from both sides of the aisle. As I recall, the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] was present, as, of course, was the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. I believe the overwhelming consensus was that we wanted to be certain that the island of the Dominican Republic was not lost to the Communists. No one was absolutely certain as to what was happening. At this point there was no time for a study by the Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee. The country was on fire; people were dying; property was being destroyed; Communists were on hand and chaos was in charge. Something had to be done and it had to be done based on the best information then available. The President was told by our Ambassador, by the representatives of the CIA, the Peace Corps, the USIA, and the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, and the Navy. All spoke with a loud and unanimous voice—and they said, "the revolution has been going on for 4 days—it is now out of hand and you Mr. President must send in troops to save lives and property." It was very clear that at the White House, at that time that the overwhelming consensus was of the belief that we had better send in enough forces to make certain that the indiscriminate shooting and looting would be stopped, and that the Commu-

nists would not take over. I do not agree that too many troops were sent into the Dominican Republic. For that matter, I do not believe we are sending too many troops to Vietnam. If one argued the same philosophy as that expressed by the Senator from Arkansas, perhaps he could say we are sending too many troops to Vietnam, because we are now beginning to win there.

Surely no one would argue that we are not supposed to win just because we are opposing Communists, and some misled liberals who are on their side. We are fighting Communists in Vietnam. We are having to oppose them—one way or another, all around the world, and for a certainty they sought to take over the Dominican Republic just as they did Cuba, and that was a matter of grave concern to us when the President sent in our troops to Santo Domingo. I do not see anything wrong with that, as the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has indicated. What is wrong with trying to save a country from communism?

We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he started his revolution. He was acclaimed—when he started out—the greatest social revolutionary to come along in modern day. I remember when the New York Times and other newspapers were writing lyrical articles about Castro and what a great man he was. I recall his appearance before the American Society of Newspaper Publishers and Editors, where he was lauded and applauded. I also recall when he sat with the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Capitol and I asked him, "When are you going to have elections?"

Castro replied, "There is no use in having elections, because I will be elected over and over again."

Castro made that statement in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and still many thought he was a great democratic leader. Castro proved that it was not necessary to have a large number of Communists present in order to deliver a country to communism. When a country like Cuba falls to communism it costs us hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. So we could not afford to take a chance in the Dominican Republic.

I do not understand the philosophy of the Senator from Arkansas in this respect. I have the greatest affection and highest respect for my former chairman, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], but I do not understand, for the life of me, what the objection is to sending enough troops to the Dominican Republic to do the job, or even perhaps sending 200 or 300 more. The job was done. The country has not been lost. It is today moving in the direction of establishing a constitutional government, so that, hopefully, constitutional rights will be in the near future preserved.

I again totally associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if it could be done as the Senator from Arkansas proposes, I would much prefer to treat the Communists with

Christian fellowship, love, and truth, without having to resort to violence. A number of fine people, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, used that approach, but did not get fair with it. If we are to keep the Communists from taking over, we cannot rely on them to tell the truth; we cannot rely on them to admit that they are Communists; we cannot rely on their regime not to murder and exterminate people who do not agree with communism.

I would be willing to take a chance on meeting Communists in free elections. Why will they not agree to free elections? They will not agree to them here or anywhere else. About the only time Communists are willing to agree to free elections is when the Communists cannot win by force of arms nor by blackmail, assassination, or brutality. They have yet to win their first free election.

A program of good will, kindness, truth, and love they neighbor, while it is fine to be extended toward Communists, is never seen coming from the opposite direction, toward us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to try to keep the record straight—and it was not my intention to engage in a general, running debate on how much we disagree with communism—I assure the Senator from Louisiana that I am not a Communist and do not wish to promote that system.

The policies I am talking about involve a judgment as to whether they do or do not promote communism.

The only election in the Dominican Republic that we are told was absolutely free and without any threat, was the one that resulted in the election of Mr. Bosch. But he was thrown out by a coup.

The Senator from Louisiana is saying that the whole movement of U.S. troops was to prevent Communists from taking over. At the meeting at the White House it is my impression—and I believe the press reports will confirm it—that we were told that the movement was to save American lives. Much was said about the saving of 1,500 American lives and several hundred other lives. It was put on the basis of saving innocent people, particularly Americans and the nationals of other countries. I said in my speech that I thoroughly agreed with that proposal.

When a situation endangers the lives of people who had nothing to do with the occurrence, it is quite proper for us to act. That was the theory on which our action was based at the meeting. We were not told that a Communist takeover was in progress.

I recall asking—and perhaps someone else asked—what the situation was with respect to communism. We were told that three individuals had been identified as Communists. This is out of several thousand who were engaged in the uprising.

I must say this in all charity to the Director of the CIA, who had been sworn in that very noon, so he could not have been expected to know what had taken place. He had been the Director of the CIA only about 10 hours, perhaps 6 hours. I do not blame him at all for either inadvertence or anything else. About a

week later, after the situation had been reviewed, it was announced that 55 persons were Communists.

No one believed that Rafael Molina Urena was a Communist. He had been the President of the Senate under the Bosch regime. Under their Constitution, as I understand it, since Bosch did not return, Molina was what we would consider to be the legitimate successor. I understand that that was the process of succession. He was designated by the party in power, the PRD Party, which is the only legitimate party which had won an election, by 58 percent, in 1962. The party was thrown out by a coup, as the Senator knows.

This was an effort to reestablish themselves. The leaders of this revolution were not accused of being Communists. The Senator is assuming the very fact in controversy. The very fact that I question is that there was any firm and convincing evidence that this was a Communist takeover, that the revolutionary power, the revolutionary movement was dominated and controlled by Communists.

We had 13 meetings on this matter. To me, there is very little evidence from the testimony of administration witnesses. Every witness was an administration witness except Muñoz-Marín, who is certainly no enemy of the administration. He has been a very close friend of this administration. As the Senator knows, he was a long-time Governor of Puerto Rico. There was no serious and convincing evidence, or even anything close to being convincing evidence, that the leaders of the revolution in the beginning were Communists. They were members of the PRD Party. They were people who wished to reaffirm their claim to the presidency. They had been thrown out by a coup.

The Senator assumes that this was a Communist takeover.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I decline to yield further.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raised the point in my speech that there was not any evidence to show that it was a Communist plot. I think that it was more likely a PRD revolution.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator has failed to distinguish between non-Communist liberals who were involved there and the hard-core Castro-trained Communists who were trained to take over. When Castro took over Cuba, knowing the experience we have had if we had followed the Fulbright doctrine, the takeover would have occurred nevertheless, because many sincere liberals were opposed to Batista while hard-core Communists were prepared to kill the Socialist or non-Communist liberals and take the place over.

That is what they did and they did it as quickly as these honest and sincere people who believed in freedom discovered that they had made a mistake and fallen into a trap. The people discovered that it was then too late. They could not extricate themselves. Some of those people gave up their lives and were injured and taken prisoners at the Bay of Pigs invasion when they tried to liberate Cuba from Castro.

We had enough information to know that the Dominican revolt was a move in the direction of communism. This country had all the justification that it needed to intervene. It had sufficient justification to require our going in there and protecting our citizens and the citizens of other countries.

Oddly enough, De Gaulle can find more reason to criticize our country, a country which has defended France more than any other country, than any man who has ever had a position of great responsibility and power in the free world.

Mr. de Gaulle found fault with the United States sending troops to a country to protect human life. However, De Gaulle's Ambassador rushed down and asked that the French Embassy be protected by American troops against irresponsible revolutionaries who were running down the corridors with machine-guns and killing people. We took it upon ourselves to protect innocent people from friendly nations, people who were not a party to the revolt at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no question about that.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator suggests something that is inconsistent, with respect to this Nation contributing troops in this situation. We did not do it when Mr. Bosch was run out of there.

As a practical matter, the President was right in taking the position which he did in the military coup which involved Mr. Bosch. It was a fight between one crowd of anti-Communists and another crowd. I do not believe that we would have had any right to go in there with troops at that time. However, on the other hand, if this were a Communist takeover, or if it had the possibility of being a Communist takeover, if we had the information, which we did, that a great many hard-core Communist Moscow-trained or Castro-trained Communists were in there seeking to start a revolution and to take charge and take over the country, we should have attempted to frustrate that effort if we could.

I believe the record shows that every person whose advice the President sought on Capitol Hill, be he Republican or Democrat—and if any Senator wants to question this statement, he can say so—either advised the President to go or did not advise him not to go.

I believe that every single person advised the President to go, with the exception of the suggestion made by the Senator from Arkansas, and, to the best of my knowledge, the President followed that advice.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas talks about his recollection with regard to how many Communists we thought were in Santo Domingo. It was all a guess. My recollection is that it was approximately 58. And the 58 were Communist leaders. Actually nobody had any idea for a certainty how many Communists were there or how many of the revolutionists were on the Communist side.

At the time that Bosch was thrown out

by internal revolution, I do not believe that anybody advised the then President of the United States that our people were being fired on and that our property was being destroyed, nor that we should send troops. I do not believe that the then Ambassador, nor the Army, nor the Navy, nor the CIA, nor the Peace Corps gave such advice. I do not believe that any of the people who, on this April 1965 occasion, advised the President that we needed troops there to protect our property and the lives of people, advised that we should send troops on that other occasion. When Bosch was forced by a coup to leave Santo Domingo and move to Puerto Rico.

I believe that it might be said about that meeting at the White House to which we have been making reference, and I do not believe this will violate to any great extent the rules with regard to keeping such meetings secret—that everybody who was there recalls that when the President was advising us as to what he was going to do—a telephone call came through, the fellow who was talking from the Dominican Republic said that he was at that moment under the table and the bullets were coming through the window and surging all around him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Bullets were whizzing through the window of the Embassy by the Ambassador.

Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator is correct. At the very moment of the telephone conversation, bullets were coming through the window. What is the President supposed to say—"Let us go out and reason with these people?" This was no time to reason. These people were not in a reasoning mood. Something had to be done, and the President was advised to take a firm and courageous course and he took it.

At that time, we thought that some 1,560 people were killed in the first few days. Remember the President did not send our troops until the revolution had been going on for 4 days. Everybody's hindsight is better than their foresight. It may be that there were not 1,560 people killed. However, many of them were killed, and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. Our Embassy was being fired upon. Other embassies were being looted. Thank God our troops finally showed up.

The Senator from Louisiana has pointed out that by virtue of the fact that we had our troops down there, some 5,600 people, nationals of other countries, were safely evacuated. Because of the presence of our troops, there was no great loss of life.

If we had delayed; if we had had a study; if the President had vacillated, hundreds and hundreds of other people would have been killed and untold damage would have been done. But most importantly that country would be in the hands of the Communists today.

One of the significant things that is never talked about when we discuss this Dominican matter is the Organization of American States. At its fourth inter-parliamentary session—in the official meetings or consultations, the Organization of American States directed that one of their groups go to Santo Domingo

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and make a study. These are Latin people, not from the United States—but from various countries of Latin America. The official OAS group concluded that the President of the United States did the only sensible and practical thing that could have been done under the circumstances, when he dispatched troops to restore law and order.

I repeat these are Latins, familiar with the area, the conditions, the people. They approved the President's action. It seems to me that what we ought to be doing is applauding the President. Thank God that most of the people are doing that. The Gallup poll shows that 85 percent of the people approve of what the President did in Santo Domingo. I believe that those people who approve of the action of the President are correct. And I believe a majority of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and a majority of this Senate believe our President acted correctly and courageously.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the President had the advice of a nine-man American team in Santo Domingo. The team included those who had responsibility, anybody in charge of any organization, from the Peace Corps up to the Ambassador himself. He had the advice of the State Department, and the advice of his own White House staff, which is supposed to be available to him for such purpose. Some reference was made to the fact that the man from the CIA had only been there a short time. But that man was a naval admiral, and he was not merely saying what he learned in 5 days; he was giving the best judgment he could based on the advice of experts who have been studying such problems for many years.

If those who had responsibility to tell us how to deal with the Communists in Santo Domingo, and how to deal with the Communists in the Dominican Republic and all those people, so far as I know unanimously—and the record will show—provided such advice to the President, who would say that should be done?

The Senator said when he was there, that perhaps he did not advise us not to go because he thought the decision had been made. That is my understanding. My understanding is that the President had taken the precaution to do what he should have done, that is, to put the carriers in a position so that he would have the troops available if the decision was made to go in.

Now he has been criticized for going in with too much. I suppose next year he will be criticized for going too soon.

But if we were compelled to move, I would want to be able to avoid a complete Communist takeover. If we had to go in, it was better to go with too much too soon than to go with too little too late.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of what the record shows, I based my speech upon the records of the hearings before the committee. Many wild rumors were published in the newspapers which our own people did not confirm. For ex-

ample, the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] says 1,560 were killed in the first 4 days.

As of May 8, the Red Cross confirmed a count of 150 dead and 605 wounded in hostilities. They were not Americans. No American citizens was killed or shot or injured until after the Marines were landed and the Marines exchanged shots with the revolutionists.

So subsequent events did not confirm the advice about the necessity and the danger that came from the Embassy.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana has the floor at this moment, unless he will yield for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have not yielded, Mr. President. I wish to make this statement, and I will try to cut it short.

I know the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has a responsibility to the Senate. He is trying to discharge it. I shall try to cooperate with him.

It is one thing to think about these matters, ask for hearings, bring people in, see what the record shows, and take a nice vacation and analyze the matter, and come back in a week and say, "I am not sure this was necessary at all."

But it is quite another thing if the man is there, and shooting is going on, and he must move now or it will be too late. He cannot stop to figure whether 315 or 575 or 1,500 people have been killed. He must move now.

It is easy to find fault with the President of the United States. Senators have, and I am sure they will continue to do so.

But one thing we cannot say about the man who is President of the United States: We cannot say he cannot move. I say to the Senate that when hurricane Betsy hit Louisiana last week, the worst disaster in our history, I called the President and said, "Mr. President, the most horrible thing that has ever happened to Louisiana has just occurred. The people ought to see you and know that their Government and their President are interested in their welfare. It will give them the courage to try to hold out and try to help themselves, if they just know that help is on its way, and that they have this great country on their side."

That man has on his hands the war in Vietnam, but he called me and said, "Be at the White House in 15 minutes. If you are not at the White House in 15 minutes, I will be on my way to Louisiana by myself." I got there and we went down there, and he told those people that all of the red tape would be cut, and that help was on its way.

We are getting help. If I had to choose between one man who thinks it might not be all that serious, and says, "Let us wait and get the report and analyze it and think about it a little longer," and the man who says, "Wait a minute; if we do all this, it might be

too late," I think I would take the fellow who could move.

Many battles have been lost by waiting to see. The South would be a separate nation today—and I am glad we are not—had it not been that a citizen of Louisiana, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, waited until the smoke lifted on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh, down in Tennessee.

Had that man had the aggressive instincts of our President, he would have pushed Grant's army into the Tennessee River before General Buell was able to bring up a whole new Federal Army to join the fight. On that occasion, Albert Sidney Johnson had bled to death in his saddle pressing the attack. When Johnson died, and Beauregard found himself in command, he preferred to halt the attack and renew it on the following day. By that time Beauregard was facing two Union armies instead of one.

Had Beauregard possessed the initiative of our President, he would have run the Union Army into the river on the evening of the first day, and instead of Grant defeating the Southern Army, and proceeding to capture one army at Vicksburg and another at Appomattox, Grant would have been relieved of duty as an incompetent, and Lincoln would have never found himself a great general.

But, Mr. President, we have a President who moved. He moved in the tradition of our great country, and in the tradition of all great Americans, who do not believe in waiting until the smoke lifts in Santo Domingo or until the dust settles in China to do something about these things. Mr. President, I thank the merciful Lord that our President possesses a sense of urgency and that he possesses initiative.

I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia will cooperate, as always, with his colleagues. He knows that the subject matter which has been discussed is important. As the assistant majority leader has stated, legislation is pending in the Chamber. It, too, deals with important subject matter of concern to the American people.

I ask unanimous consent, however, that the Senator from Delaware be permitted to address the Senators on a subject which is not germane.

Mr. ROBERTSON. How long does the Senator from Delaware wish to hold the floor?

Mr. RANDOLPH. Approximately 10 minutes. He talked with me about an hour and a half ago about his request. At that time, we did not know that the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Louisiana would take as much time as they have taken.

I, too, wish to go forward with the pending legislation, but I feel that I at least implied to the Senator from Delaware that I would submit this unanimous-consent request, and I do so with the understanding that he speak not more than 10 minutes.

On page 12, lines 1 and 2, after the word "pay" in line 1 strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of".

On page 16, line 15, after the word "pay" strike out the words "the Federal pro rata share of the".

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I would like to explain the purpose of the amendment which I have offered for myself and the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF]. The committee bill provides that the cost shall be allocated between the Federal Government and the States in the same proportion that costs are allocated for construction of the Interstate Highway and primary systems—that is, 90 percent to be paid by the Federal Government and 10 percent by the States, in respect to the Interstate Highway System, and 50 percent by the Federal Government and 50 percent by the States with respect to the primary system.

I support the objectives of the bill, and voted to report it to the Senate. But yesterday, at the close of the session, I stated my reasons for having presented this amendment in committee, and the reasons which lead me to offer it today.

In the subcommittee this amendment was adopted by a large vote, but in the full committee the action of the subcommittee was reversed by a vote of 8 to 5.

I offer this amendment for two principal reasons. One reason is that it is a national program. It is so declared by the bill and by the President.

The second reason for requiring the full amount to be paid by the Federal Government is that the bill would impose a penalty upon States not acceding to its program—the penalty being the denial of all Federal-aid funds for construction of highways. With such a penalty, and no State could accept such a penalty, the program proposed in the bill—worthy as it is—cannot be considered a true voluntary Federal-State aid program. The denial of all funds to a State would amount to millions of dollars to a State.

In the case of California it would amount to a denial of \$336 million annually. In my own State it would amount to \$74 million. In other States it would be in similar proportions.

The bill would effectually require the States to accept this program and that their legislatures appropriate money to pay for its cost. It is a worthy program. I voted to report it to the Senate, but I do not approve its mandatory features.

Over 100 Federal-aid programs have been enacted. None mandatorily requires State acceptance. If it is to be exercised, I believe the Federal Government should pay its full cost.

I understand there are others who desire to speak. I shall not speak further at this time.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, I concur in this amendment for all of the reasons outlined. This is a coercive program.

We are saying to the States that they have to go into the secondary road system where always we have had the pro-

vision that billboards were permitted. We are saying to them that they must remove billboards on the 50-50 allocation that has always been proposed.

There is a difference in the Interstate System, which is new, which goes through new areas and new territory. We say that under the law we will give the same proportion of assistance to the State to remove billboards that we gave for the financing of other highway systems, such as under the 90-10 Interstate System.

So far as the secondary systems are concerned, we have always had the right to erect billboards. This is a prevailing system in all the States. Yet, we are saying to the States that they must remove the billboards or they will not be permitted to share in the Federal highway program. It is coercion.

We are taking away from the States their police power to remove billboards and we are saying they have to make compensation.

This is a national program. We have decided we are going to remove billboards from the interstate and secondary systems. Therefore, I concur that we should pay that cost out of the national budget. We should not force the States to forgo all of their participation in the interstate program if they do not want to take away a man's livelihood, or a man's business, which he has had for many years.

I feel strongly that the States should use their funds for secondary road systems and the farm-to-market roads, and for the development of primary highways on the present allocation, and should not be forced to compensate the billboard operators. I feel strongly that the cost should come out of the Federal budget.

Therefore, I concur in the amendment.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, even though the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Mr. FULBRIGHT], will not be germane to the pending legislation (S. 2084), I ask unanimous consent that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee [Senator FULBRIGHT] be allowed to speak for not to exceed 1 hour.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Young of Ohio in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered. The rule of germaneness is waived.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not intend to object, but I wish to have the assurance that the amendment which has been stated will be the pending question at the conclusion of the remarks by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair states to the senior Senator from Kentucky that his amendment will be the pending question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the formation of a provisional government in Santo Domingo under the leadership of Dr. Hector Garcia-Godoy is good news. It provides reason for cautious optimism as to the future and testifies as well to the arduous and patient efforts of the OAS mediating team. I wish to pay tribute especially to Ambassador Bunker for his wisdom and patience in handling this difficult affair. The formation of a provisional government is not the end of the Dominican crisis, but it does bring to an end a tragic and dangerous phase of the crisis. Many problems remain, particularly the problem of establishing the authority of a democratic government over the Dominican military. Nonetheless, the situation now seems to be moving into a less dangerous and more hopeful phase. At this time of relative calm it is appropriate, desirable and, I think, necessary to review events in the Dominican Republic and the U.S. role in those events. The purpose of such a review—and its only purpose—is to develop guidelines for wise and effective policies in the future.

I was in doubt about the advisability of making a statement on the Dominican affair until some of my colleagues made public statements on the floor. Their views on the way in which the committee proceedings were conducted and, indeed, on the Dominican crisis as a whole, are so diametrically opposed to my own that I now consider it my duty to express my personal conclusions drawn from the hearings held by the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The suggestions that have been made that the committee was prejudiced in its approach against the administration's policies are, in my opinion, without merit. The committee was impartial and fair in giving a full and detailed hearing to the administration's point of view, so much so, in fact, that it heard only one witness from outside the Government.

U.S. policy in the Dominican crisis was characterized initially by overtimidity and subsequently by overreaction. Throughout the whole affair, it has also been characterized by a lack of candor.

These are general conclusions I have reached from a painstaking review of the salient features of the extremely complex situation. These judgments are made, of course, with the benefit of hindsight and, in fairness, it must be conceded there were no easy choices available to the United States in the Dominican Republic. Nonetheless, it is the task

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Deputy Chief Mowry's public statement that the patrolmen ought not to have arrested the boys. The confidence of various groups in society in the fairness of the police is of course the key to public cooperation.

The incident also illustrates the value of a police community relations division under an able and forthright officer like Chief Mowry. It was his first test in a highly demanding job, and he deserves the community's confidence. Washington's Metropolitan Police constitute one of the most efficient forces in the country. It is now showing that it understands the value of restraint and tact as well.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, both Deputy Chief Mowry and Inspector Causey have been captains of the 14th precinct and are good tacticians in community relations work and because of this, enjoy the respect of every segment of the committee.

I would hope and expect, and I am sure many of my colleagues would agree, that they will get the fullest cooperation in their endeavors for I am certain the community will be far better off for their efforts.

It is both interesting and pleasing for me to note that Howard Mowry comes from an old and much respected Rhode Island family. So I take this opportunity to wish him well in his new position and to reiterate my interest and hope for a vigorous effort against crime by those who are charged with the responsibility of law enforcement in the District of Columbia.

WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMAN?

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, for some time it has been the proud boast of the managers of America's space effort that unlike the Soviets, our experiments are conducted in full view of the public. This, it has been asserted, is characteristic of the differences in our form of government and the closed society of the Communist world.

Now, a dark cloud has been cast on that claim. Assertions of censorship and news management have been made by the respected science writer of the Washington Evening Star, William Hines.

Some of the clumsy attempts at censorship are both silly and stupid.

But, more importantly, they seriously undermine not only this Nation's confidence, but that of the world, in our ability and determination to tell the truth.

Since the time of the Bay of Pigs fiasco when Mr. Arthur Sylvester, the voice of the Pentagon, asserted the Government's right to lie to save itself, we have seen recurring examples of news management and cover up and censorship. We have seen a President reciting cheery little items of economic good tidings to a national television audience, days before the appropriate Government bureau would ordinarily release such news and the sole purpose is to conceal or counteract such hard and unhappy facts as the chronic unemployment figures.

Some time ago, Mr. President, after the Pentagon had claimed smashing victories in our air strikes against the North Vietnamese, I asked to see photographs

of the damaged areas. I was told they were "not available." I asked why U.S. television networks were carrying films by Vietcong photographers but were seemingly unable to obtain footage showing the effects of our raids. There was no explanation.

And now there are distressing signals that the space program is falling prey to the same dread disease of secrecy.

It would be my hope, Mr. President, that the communications media themselves, which argue so eloquently for the freedom of the press which our Constitution guarantees them, would increase their protests against news management and censorship.

Mr. Hines has done a great service both to his craft and to the public in his article which appeared in the September 1 issue of the Star. I ask unanimous consent to have it printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Sept. 1, 1965]

WHO WILL WATCH THE WATCHMAN?

(By William Hines)

The Pentagon has surprised almost everyone with its promptness in applying the first squeeze of censorship and news management to its new manned orbiting laboratory (MOL) program.

Most people assumed that soon after the military got a manned role in space, it would start classifying it, but few could have foreseen the rapidity with which restrictions came. The elapsed time from President Johnson's announcement of the start of MOL at his press conference last week to the Pentagon's first fumbling bit of news management was exactly 2 hours.

The restriction was picaresque and worse than pointless: It was unenforceable.

Reporters trooping to an MOL briefing at the Pentagon were instructed that they would not be allowed to make tape recordings or to mention the name of the official (Dr. Albert C. Hall, Deputy Director of Research and Engineering), who was briefing them. This exchange then occurred:

"Why not?"

"Because that's the way we prefer to do it."

The briefing was highly technical and contained many points that could be misunderstood by reporters and thus misinterpreted by readers who, in the final analysis, will be paying the expensive tab for MOL. A tape would have been helpful.

The briefing was later transmitted by telephone to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Houston Center, where a large contingent of reporters was covering the flight of Gemini 5.

The same "no tape, no attribution" rule was invoked at Houston, but was ignored by many reporters who refused to be bound by secrecy they knew could not be enforced. Tape recordings were made and freely circulated.

The handling of the MOL briefing is by no means unique. The current longstanding gag on Russian space accomplishments is another excellent example.

Soon after the Kennedy administration came in, the Government ceased reporting Soviet space launchings, including attempts that failed. Manifestly the Russians knew when they launched; they also knew we knew. The people left in the dark were—and are—those here in the United States who are paying for the Nation's elaborate and presumably efficient spacecraft detection system. Nobody in the Government defends this policy, yet it persists.

The Defense Department is not the only

traducer of a free news flow. The space agency gives news management the old college try every time a manned spacecraft goes up.

Of all the significant news locations in a Gemini flight, the only one not covered by the combined news media (meaning press, radio, and TV) is the most important one of all, the mission control center at Houston.

It is not a secret place, nor one in which unnecessary traffic is discouraged. Flight Director Christopher C. Kraft already has stated publicly that he would rather have a Soviet observer in his control center than an American journalist. Further, every clerk and secretary among the 4,600 NASA civil servants who could spare 5 or 10 minutes from work was encouraged to look in.

On one flight the motion picture actor Jimmy Stewart was an interested observer. Even newspaper publishers have been admitted, possibly on the theory that they are not really "working press," and hence harmless.

But neither camera nor tape recorder nor pen-and-paper reporter is allowed in the nonsecret room at any time during a flight. This is a measure of how far we have come in 20 short years. Even in the supersecret atom bomb project, the national press had a "pool" representative, William L. Laurence of the New York Times. This is not to suggest that there has been any "coverup" to date. In the course of missions, Kraft gives regular, full, and apparently frank accounts of flight activities, and opens himself to detailed questioning. So do his associates. A mission commentary of less consistent accuracy and authenticity is broadcast.

But whether or not there has been suppression to date is not the point. All flights so far have ended happily, and nothing succeeds like success. There has been no reason for a coverup.

The point is that the opportunity for news management definitely exists in mission control—and it is an axiom of political science that where opportunity exists, there are always people waiting to seize it.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS in the chair). Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed.

SCENIC DEVELOPMENT AND ROAD BEAUTIFICATION OF THE FEDERAL AID HIGHWAY SYSTEMS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be laid before the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (S. 2084) to provide for scenic development and road beautification of the Federal-aid highway systems.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 2084) to provide for scenic development and road beautification of the Federal-aid highway systems.

AMENDMENT NO. 451

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Montana [Mr. METCALF], I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated.

The legislative clerk read the amendment (No. 451), as follows:

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of diplomacy to make wise decisions when they need to be made and U.S. diplomacy failed to do so in the Dominican crisis.

It cannot be said with assurance that the United States could have changed the course of events by acting differently. What can be said with assurance is that the United States did not take advantage of several opportunities in which it might have changed the course of events. The reason appears to be that, very close to the beginning of the revolution, U.S. policymakers decided that it should not be allowed to succeed. This decision seems to me to have been based on exaggerated estimates of Communist influence in the rebel movement in the initial stages and on distaste for the return to power of Juan Bosch or of a government controlled by Bosch's party, the PRD—Dominican Revolutionary Party.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is of critical importance and I shall comment on it later. The essential point, however, is that the United States, on the basis of ambiguous evidence, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist dominated, or would certainly become so. It apparently never occurred to anyone that the United States could also attempt to influence the course which the revolution took. We misread prevailing tendencies in Latin America by overlooking or ignoring the fact that any reform movement is likely to attract Communist support. We thus failed to perceive that if we are automatically to oppose any reform movement that Communists adhere to, we are likely to end up opposing every reform movement, making ourselves the prisoners of reactionaries who wish to preserve the status quo—and the status quo in many countries is not good enough.

The principal reason for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo was faulty advice given to the President by his representatives in the Dominican Republic at the time of acute crisis. Much of this advice was based on misjudgment of the facts of the situation; some of it appears to have been based on inadequate evidence or, in some cases, simply inaccurate information. On the basis of the information and counsel he received, the President could hardly have acted other than he did.

I am hopeful, and reasonably confident, that the mistakes made by the United States in the Dominican Republic can be retrieved and that it will be possible to avoid repeating them in the future. These purposes can be served, however, only if the shortcomings of U.S. policy are thoroughly reviewed and analyzed. I make my remarks today in the hope of contributing to that process.

The development of the Dominican crisis, beginning on April 24, 1965, provides a classic study of policymaking in a fast-changing situation in which each decision reduces the range of options available for future decisions so that errors are compounded and finally, indeed, there are few if any options except to follow through on an ill-conceived course of action. Beyond a certain point the Dominican story acquired some of the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.

Another theme that emerges from the Dominican crisis is the occurrence of a striking change in U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic and the possibility—not a certainty, because the signs are ambiguous, but only the possibility—of a major change as well in the general Latin American policies of the United States. Obviously, an important change in the official outlook on Dominican affairs occurred between September 1963, when the United States was vigorously opposed to the overthrow of Juan Bosch, and April 1965, when the United States was either unenthusiastic or actually opposed to his return.

What happened in that period to change the assessment of Bosch from favorable to unfavorable? It is quite true that Bosch as President did not distinguish himself as an administrator, but that was well known in 1963. It is also true, however, and much more to the point as far as the legitimate interests of the United States are concerned, that Bosch had received 58 percent of the votes in a free and honest election and that he was presiding over a reform-minded government in tune with the Alliance for Progress. This is a great deal more than can be said for any other President of the Dominican Republic.

The question therefore remains as to how and why the attitude of the U.S. Government changed so strikingly between September 1963 and April 1965. And the question inevitably arises whether this shift in the administration's attitude toward the Dominican Republic is part of a broader shift in its attitude toward other Latin American countries, whether, to be specific, the U.S. Government now views the vigorous reform movements of Latin America—such as Christian Democracy in Chile, Peru, and Venezuela, APRA in Peru and Accion Democratica in Venezuela—as threatening to the interests of the United States. And if this is the case, what kind of Latin American political movements would now be regarded as friendly to the United States and beneficial to its interests?

I should like to make it very clear that I am raising a question not offering an answer. I am frankly puzzled as to the current attitude of the U.S. Government toward reformist movements in Latin America. On the one hand, President Johnson's deep personal commitment to the philosophy and aims of the Alliance for Progress is clear; it was convincingly expressed, for example, in his speech to the Latin American Ambassadors on the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress—a statement in which the President compared the Alliance for Progress with his own enlightened program for a Great Society at home. On the other hand, one notes a general tendency on the part of our policymakers not to look beyond a Latin American politician's anticommunism. One also notes in certain Government agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, a preoccupation with counterinsurgency, which is to say, with the prospect of revolutions and means of suppressing them. This preoccupation is manifested in dubious and costly research projects,

such as the recently discredited Camelot; these studies claim to be scientific but beneath their almost unbelievably opaque language lies an unmistakable military and reactionary bias.

It is of great importance that the uncertainty as to U.S. aims in Latin America be resolved. We cannot successfully advance the cause of popular democracy and at the same time align ourselves with corrupt and reactionary oligarchies; yet that is what we seem to be trying to do. The direction of the Alliance for Progress is toward social revolution in Latin America; the direction of our Dominican intervention is toward the suppression of revolutionary movements which are supported by Communists or suspected of being influenced by Communists. The prospect of an election in 9 months which may conceivably produce a strong democratic government is certainly reassuring on this score, but the fact remains that the reaction of the United States at the time of acute crisis was to intervene forcibly and illegally against a revolution which, had we sought to influence it instead of suppressing it, might have produced a strong popular government without foreign military intervention. Since just about every revolutionary movement is likely to attract Communist support, at least in the beginning, the approach followed in the Dominican Republic, if consistently pursued, must inevitably make us the enemy of all revolutions and therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the hemisphere.

We simply cannot have it both ways; we must choose between the Alliance for Progress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the status quo in Latin America. The choice which we are to make is the principal unanswered question arising out of the unhappy events in the Dominican Republic and, indeed, the principal unanswered question for the future of our relations with Latin America.

It is not surprising that we Americans are not drawn toward the uncouth revolutionaries of the non-Communist left. We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth of July speeches, the most truly revolutionary nation on earth; we are, on the contrary, much closer to being the most unrevolutionary nation on earth. We are sober and satisfied and comfortable and rich; our institutions are stable and old and even venerable; and our Revolution of 1776, for that matter, was not much of an upheaval compared to the French and Russian revolutions and to current and impending revolutions in Latin America, Asia, and Africa.

Our heritage of stability and conservatism is a great blessing, but it also has the effect of limiting our understanding of the character of social revolution and sometimes as well of the injustices which spawn them. Our understanding of revolutions and their causes is imperfect not because of any failures of mind or character but because of our good fortune since the Civil War in never having experienced sustained social injustice without hope of legal or more or less peaceful remedy. We are called upon, therefore, to give our understanding and our sympathy and support to movements

which are alien to our experience and jarring to our preferences and prejudices.

We must try to understand social revolution and the injustices that give it rise because they are the heart and core of the experience of the great majority of people now living in the world. In Latin America we may prefer to associate with the well-bred, well-dressed businessmen who often hold positions of power, but Latin American reformers regard such men as aliens in their own countries who neither identify with their own people nor even sympathize with their aspirations. Such leaders are regarded by educated young Latin Americans as a "consular bourgeoisie," by which they mean business-oriented conservatives who more nearly represent the interests of foreign businessmen than the interests of their own people. Men like Donald Reid—who is one of the better of this category of leaders—may have their merits, but they are not the force of the future in Latin America.

It is the revolutionaries of the non-Communist left who have most of the popular support in Latin America. The Radical Party in Chile, for example, is full of 19th century libertarians whom many North Americans would find highly congenial, but it was recently crushed in national elections by a group of rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats. It may be argued that the Christian Democrats are anti-United States, and to a considerable extent some of them are—more so now, it may be noted, than prior to the intervention of the United States in the Dominican Republic—but they are not Communists and they have popular support. They have also come to terms with the American copper companies in Chile; that is something which the predecessor conservative government was unable to do and something which a Communist government would have been unwilling to do.

The movement of the future in Latin America is social revolution. The question is whether it is to be Communist or democratic revolution and the choice which the Latin Americans make will depend in part on how the United States uses its great influence. It should be very clear that the choice is not between social revolution and conservative oligarchy but whether, by supporting reform, we bolster the popular non-Communist left or whether, by supporting unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising generation of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of communism like that of Fidel Castro in Chile.

In my Senate speech of March 25, 1964, I commented as follows on the prospect of revolution:

I am not predicting violent revolutions in Latin America or elsewhere. Still less am I advocating them. I wish only to suggest that violent social revolutions are a possibility in countries where feudal oligarchies resist all meaningful change by peaceful means. We must not, in our preference for the democratic procedures envisioned by the Charter of Punta del Este, close our minds to the possibility that democratic procedures may fail in certain countries and that where democracy does fail violent social convulsions may occur.

I think that in the case of the Dominican Republic we did close our minds to the causes and to the essential legitimacy of revolution in a country in which democratic procedures had failed. That, I think, is the central fact concerning the participation of the United States in the Dominican revolution and, possibly as well, its major lesson for the future. I turn now to comment on some of the events which began last April 24 in Santo Domingo.

When the Dominican revolution began on Saturday, April 24, the United States had three options available. First, it could have supported the Reid Cabral government; second, it could have supported the revolutionary forces; and third, it could do nothing.

The administration chose the last course. When Donald Reid Cabral asked for U.S. intervention on Sunday morning, April 25, he was given no encouragement. He then resigned, and considerable disagreement ensued over the nature of the government to succeed him. The party of Juan Bosch, the PRD, or Dominican Revolutionary Party, asked for a "U.S. presence" at the transfer of government power but was given no encouragement. Thus, there began at that time a chaotic situation which amounted to civil war in a country without an effective government.

What happened in essence was that the Dominican military refused to support Reid and were equally opposed to Bosch or other PRD leaders as his successor. The PRD, which had the support of some military officers, announced that Rafael Molina Urena, who had been President of the Senate during the Bosch regime, would govern as Provisional President pending Bosch's return. At this point, the military leaders delivered an ultimatum, which the rebels ignored, and at about 4:30 on the afternoon of April 25 the air force and navy began firing at the National Palace. Later in the day, PRD leaders asked the U.S. Embassy to use its influence to persuade the air force to stop the attacks. The Embassy made it clear it would not intervene on behalf of the rebels, although on the following day, Monday, April 26, the Embassy did persuade the military to stop air attacks for a limited time.

This was the first crucial point in the crisis. If the United States thought that Reid was giving the Dominican Republic the best government it had had or was likely to get, why did the United States not react more vigorously to support him? On the other hand, if the Reid government was thought to be beyond salvation, why did not the United States offer positive encouragement to the moderate forces involved in the coup, if not by providing the "U.S. presence" requested by the PRD, then at least by letting it be known that the United States was not opposed to the prospective change of regimes or by encouraging the return of Juan Bosch to the Dominican Republic? In fact, according to available evidence, the U.S. Government made no effort to contact Bosch in the initial days of the crisis.

The United States was thus at the outset unwilling to support Reid and un-

willing to support if not positively opposed to Bosch.

Events of the days following April 24 demonstrated that Reid had so little popular support that it can reasonably be argued that there was nothing the United States could have done, short of armed intervention, to save his regime. The more interesting question is why the United States was so reluctant to see Bosch returned to power. This is part of the larger question of why U.S. attitudes had changed so much since 1963 when Bosch, then in power, was warmly and repeatedly embraced and supported as few if any Latin American presidents have ever been supported by the United States.

The next crucial point in the Dominican story came on Tuesday, April 27, when rebel leaders, including Molina Urena and Caamano Deno, called at the U.S. Embassy seeking mediation and negotiations. At that time the military situation looked very bad for the rebel, or constitutionalist, forces. Ambassador Bennett, who had been instructed four times to work for a cease fire and for the formation of a military junta, felt he did not have authority to mediate; mediation, in his view, would have been "intervention." Mediation at that point might have been accomplished quietly and without massive military intervention. Twenty-four hours later the Ambassador was pleading for the marines, and as we know some 20,000 soldiers were landed—American soldiers.

On the afternoon of April 27 General Wessin y Wessin's tanks seemed about to cross the Duarte bridge into the city of Santo Domingo and the rebel cause appeared hopeless. When the rebels felt themselves rebuffed at the American Embassy, some of their leaders, including Molina Urena, sought asylum in Latin American embassies in Santo Domingo. The administration has interpreted this as evidence that the non-Communist rebels recognized growing Communist influence in their movement and were consequently abandoning the revolution. Molina Urena has said simply that he sought asylum because he thought the revolutionary cause hopeless.

An opportunity was lost on April 27. Ambassador Bennett was in a position to bring possibly decisive mediating power to bear for a democratic solution, but he chose not to do so on the ground that the exercise of his good offices at that point would have constituted intervention. In the words of Washington Post Writer Murrey Marder—one of the press people who, to the best of my knowledge, has not been assailed as prejudiced:

It can be argued with considerable weight that late Tuesday, April 27, the United States threw away a fateful opportunity to try to prevent the sequence that produced the American intervention. It allowed the relatively leaderless revolt to pass into hands which it was to allege were Communist.¹

The overriding reason for this mistake was the conviction of U.S. officials, on the basis of evidence which was fragmentary at best, that the rebels were

¹ Washington Post, June 27, 1965, p. E3.

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dominated by Communists. A related and perhaps equally important reason for the U.S. Embassy's refusal to mediate on April 27 was the desire for and, at that point, expectation of an antirebel victory. They therefore passed up an important opportunity to reduce or even eliminate Communist influence by encouraging the moderate elements among the rebels and mediating for a democratic solution.

Owing to a degree of disorganization and timidity on the part of the antirebel forces which no one, including the U.S. Embassy and the rebels themselves, anticipated, the rebels were still fighting on the morning of Wednesday, April 28. Ambassador Bennett thereupon urgently recommended that the antirebels under Air Force General de los Santos be furnished 50 walkie-talkies from U.S. Defense Department stocks in Puerto Rico. Repeating this recommendation later in the day, Bennett said that the issue was one between Castroism and its opponents. The antirebels themselves asked for armed U.S. intervention on their side; this request was refused at that time.

During the day, however, the situation deteriorated rapidly, from the point of view of public order in general and of the antirebels in particular. In mid-afternoon of April 28 Col. Pedro Bartolome Benoit, head of a junta which had been hastily assembled, asked again, this time in writing, for U.S. troops on the ground that this was the only way to prevent a Communist takeover; no mention was made of the junta's inability to protect American lives. This request was denied in Washington, and Benoit was thereupon told that the United States would not intervene unless he said he could not protect American citizens present in the Dominican Republic. Benoit was thus told in effect that if he said American lives were in danger the United States would intervene. And that is precisely what happened.

It was at this point, on April 28, that events acquired something of the predestiny of a Greek tragedy. Subsequent events—the failure of the missions of John Bartlow Martin and McGeorge Bundy, the conversion of the U.S. force into an inter-American force, the enforced stalemate between the rebels under Caamano Deno and the Imbert junta, the OAS mediation and the tortuous negotiations for a provisional government—have all been widely reported and were not fully explored in the committee hearings. In any case, the general direction of events was largely determined by the fateful decision of April 28. Once the Marines landed on that day, and especially after they were heavily reinforced in the days immediately following, the die was cast and the United States found itself deeply involved in the Dominican civil conflict, with no visible way to extricate itself, and with its hemisphere relations complicated in a way that few could have foreseen and no one could have desired.

The danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive U.S. intervention that began on the evening of April 28. In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Do-

mingo until the Marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after April 28; reports of widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be exaggerated.

Nevertheless, there can be no question that Santo Domingo was not a particularly safe place to be in the last days of April 1965. There was fighting in the streets, aircraft were strafing parts of the city, and there was indiscriminate shooting. I think that the United States would have been justified in landing a small force for the express purpose of removing U.S. citizens and other foreigners from the island. Had such a force been landed and then promptly withdrawn when it had completed its mission, I do not think that any fair-minded observer at home or abroad would have considered the United States to have exceeded its rights and responsibilities.

The United States intervened in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary force which was judged to be Communist dominated. On the basis of Ambassador Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his primary reason for recommending military intervention.

The question of the degree of Communist influence is therefore crucial, but it cannot be answered with certainty. The weight of the evidence is that Communists did not participate in planning the revolution—indeed, there is some indication that it took them by surprise—but that they very rapidly began to try to take advantage of it and to seize control of it. The evidence does not establish that the Communists at any time actually had control of the revolution. There is little doubt that they had influence within the revolutionary movement, but the degree of that influence remains a matter of speculation.

The administration, however, assumed almost from the beginning that the revolution was Communist-dominated, or would certainly become so, and that nothing short of forcible opposition could prevent a Communist takeover. In their apprehension lest the Dominican Republic become another Cuba, some of our officials seem to have forgotten that virtually all reform movements attract some Communist support, that there is an important difference between Communist support and Communist control of a political movement, that it is quite possible to compete with the Communists for influence in a reform movement rather than abandon it to them, and, most important of all, that economic development and social justice are themselves the primary and most reliable security against Communist subversion.

It is, perhaps, understandable that administration officials should have felt some sense of panic; after all, the Foreign Service officer who had the misfortune to be assigned to the Cuban desk at the time of Castro's rise to power has had his career ruined by congressional committees. Furthermore, even without this consideration, the decisions regarding the Dominican Republic had to

be made under great pressure and on the basis of inconclusive information. In charity, this can be accepted as a reason why the decisions were mistaken; but it does not change the conclusion that they were mistaken.

The point I am making is not—emphatically not—that there was no Communist participation in the Dominican crisis, but simply that the administration acted on the premise that the revolution was controlled by Communists—a premise which it failed to establish at the time and has not established since. The issue is not whether there was Communist influence in the Dominican revolution but its degree, which is something on which reasonable men can differ. The burden of proof, however, is on those who take action, and the administration has not proven its assertion of Communist control.

Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake in my opinion which also reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics. Communists are present in all Latin American countries, and they are going to inject themselves into almost any Latin American revolution and try to seize control of it. If any group or any movement with which the Communists associate themselves is going to be automatically condemned in the eyes of the United States, then we have indeed given up all hope of guiding or influencing even to a marginal degree the revolutionary movements and the demands for social change which are sweeping Latin America. Worse, if that is our view, then we have made ourselves the prisoners of the Latin American oligarchs who are engaged in a vain attempt to preserve the status quo—reactionaries who habitually use the term "Communist" very loosely, in part out of emotional predilection and in part in a calculated effort to scare the United States into supporting their selfish and discredited aims.

If the United States had really been intervening to save American lives, as it had a moral if not a strictly legal right to do, it could have done so promptly and then withdrawn and the incident would soon have been forgotten. But the United States did not intervene primarily to save American lives; it intervened to prevent what it conceived to be a Communist takeover. That meant, in the terms in which the United States defined the situation, that it was intervening against the rebels, who, however heavily they might or might not have been infiltrated by Communists, were also the advocates of the restoration of a freely elected constitutional government which had been forcibly overthrown. It also meant that the United States was intervening for the military and the oligarchy—to the detriment of the Dominican people and to the bitter disappointment of those throughout Latin America who had placed their hopes in the United States and the Alliance for Progress.

On the basis of the record, there is ample justification for concluding that, at least from the time Reid resigned, U.S.

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policy was directed toward construction of a military junta which hopefully would restore peace and conduct free elections. That is to say that U.S. policy was directed against the return of Bosch and against the success of the rebel movement.

In this connection it is interesting to recall U.S. policy toward Bosch when he was in power in the Dominican Republic between February and September of 1963. He had been elected, as I have already mentioned, in the only free and honest election ever held in the Dominican Republic, in December 1962, with 58 percent of the votes cast.

The United States placed such importance on his success that President Kennedy sent the then Vice President Johnson and Senator Humphrey, among others, to attend his inauguration in February 1963. In September 1963, when he was overthrown in a military coup, the United States made strenuous efforts—which stopped just short of sending the Marines—to keep him in power, and thereafter the United States waited almost 3 months before recognizing the successor government. Recognition came, by the way, only after the successor government had conducted military operations against a band of alleged Communist guerrillas in the mountains, and there is a suspicion that the extent of the guerrilla activities was exaggerated by the successor government in order to secure U.S. recognition.

It may be granted that Bosch was no great success as President of the Dominican Republic but, when all his faults have been listed, the fact remains that Bosch was the only freely elected President in Dominican history, the only President who had ever tried, however ineptly, to give the country a decent government, and the only President who was unquestionably in tune with the Alliance for Progress.

Despite these considerations, the United States was at the very least unenthusiastic or, more probably, opposed to Bosch's return to power in April 1965. Bosch himself was apparently not eager to return—he vacillated in the very early stages and some well-informed persons contend that he positively refused to return to the Dominican Republic. In any case, he missed a critical opportunity. But the United States was equally adamant against a return to power of Bosch's party, the PRD, which is the nearest thing to a mass-based, well-organized party that has ever existed in the Dominican Republic. The stated reason was that a PRD government would be Communist dominated.

This might conceivably have happened, but the evidence by no means supports the conclusion that it would have happened. We based our policy on a possibility rather than on anything approaching a likelihood. Obviously, if we based all our policies on the mere possibility of communism, then we would have to set ourselves against just about every progressive political movement in the world, because almost all such movements are subject to at least the theoretical danger of Communist takeover. This approach is not in the

national interest; foreign policy must be based on prospects that seem probable, hopeful and susceptible to constructive influence rather than on merely possible dangers.

One is led, therefore, to the conclusion that U.S. policymakers were unduly timid and alarmist in refusing to gamble on the forces of reform and social change. The bitter irony of such timidity is that by casting its lot with the forces of the status quo, in the probably vain hope that these forces could be induced to permit at least some reform and social change, the United States almost certainly helped the Communists to acquire converts whom they otherwise could not have won.

How vain the hopes of U.S. policymakers were is amply demonstrated by events since April 28. The junta led by Gen. Antonio Imbert, which succeeded the junta led by Colonel Benoit, proved quite intractable and indeed filled the airways daily with denunciations of the United States and the Organization of American States for preventing it from wiping out the Communist rebels. These are the same military forces which on April 28 were refusing to fight the rebels and begging for U.S. intervention. Our aim apparently was to use Imbert as a counterpoise to Caamano Deneo in the ill-founded hope that non-Communist liberals would be drawn away from the rebel side.

In practice, instead of Imbert becoming our tractable instrument, we, to a certain extent, became his; he clung tenaciously to the power we gave him and was at least as intransigent as the rebels in the protracted negotiations for a provisional government.

The resignation of Imbert and his junta provides grounds for hope that a strong popular government may come to power in the Dominican Republic, but that hope must be tempered by the fact that the military continues to wield great power in Dominican politics—power which it probably would not now have if the United States had not intervened to save it from defeat last April 28. Even with a provisional government installed in Santo Domingo, and with the prospect of an election in 9 months, there remains the basic problem of a deep and widespread demand for social change. The prospect for such social change is circumscribed by the fact that the military has not surrendered and cannot be expected voluntarily to surrender its entrenched position of privilege and outrageous corruption.

The United States has grossly underestimated the symbolism of the Bosch constitution of 1963. It can be argued that this contains unrealistic promises, but it has stirred the hopes and idealism of the Dominican people. The real objections to it, the part of conservative Dominicans, seem to be that it provides for separation of church and state and that it provides that Dominican citizens have the right to live in the Dominican Republic if they so desire—that is, that Dominican citizens who happen also to be Communists cannot be deported. In passing, one may note a similarity to the U.S. Constitution on both of these points.

The United States has also misread the dedication of the Dominican military to the status quo and to its own powers and privileges. It may be said that the United States has overestimated its ability to influence the military while failing to use to the fullest the influence it does have.

The act of United States massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic was a grievous mistake, but if one is going to cross the bridge of intervention, with all of the historical ghosts which it calls forth throughout Latin America, then one might as well cross all the way and not stop in the middle. It is too late for the United States to refrain from intervention; it is not too late to try to redeem some permanent benefit from that intervention. Specifically, I think that the influence of the United States and the Organization of American States should be used to help the Dominican people free themselves from the oppressive weight of a corrupt and privileged military establishment. It is entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it just as it has done in the past. The OAS mediating team made a contribution by bringing about the installation of a provisional government; the OAS can still make a solid contribution to Dominican democracy by urging or insisting that as part of a permanent solution, the Dominican military establishment be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals be pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad. If the United States and the OAS are going to impose a solution in the Dominican Republic, they might as well impose a good solution as a bad one.

Since preparing these remarks, I note in this morning's press that General Wessin has been induced to leave the Dominican Republic. This, I believe, is a step in the right direction.

The Foreign Relations Committee's study of the Dominican crisis leads me to draw certain specific conclusions regarding American policy in the Dominican Republic and also suggests some broader considerations regarding relations between the United States and Latin America. My specific conclusions regarding the crisis in Santo Domingo are as follows:

First. The United States intervened forcibly in the Dominican Republic in the last week of April 1965 not primarily to save American lives, as was then contended, but to prevent the victory of a revolutionary movement which was judged to be Communist-dominated. The decision to land thousands of marines on April 28 was based primarily on the fear of "another Cuba" in Santo Domingo.

Second. This fear was based on fragmentary and inadequate evidence. There is no doubt that Communists participated in the Dominican revolution on the rebel side, probably to a greater extent after than before the landing of U.S. marines on April 28, but just as it cannot be proved that the Communists would not have taken over the revolu-

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tion neither can it be proved that they would have. There is little basis in the evidence offered the committee for the assertion that the rebels were Communist-dominated or certain to become so; on the contrary, the evidence suggests a chaotic situation in which no single faction was dominant at the outset and in which everybody, including the United States, had opportunities to influence the shape and course of the rebellion.

Third. The United States let pass its best opportunities to influence the course of events. The best opportunities were on April 25, when Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, requested a "United States presence," and on April 27, when the rebels, believing themselves defeated, requested United States mediation for a negotiated settlement. Both requests were rejected, in the first instance for reasons that are not entirely clear but probably because of United States hostility to the PRD, in the second instance because the U.S. Government anticipated and desired a victory of the antirebel forces.

Fourth. U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic shifted markedly to the right between September 1963 and April 1965. In 1963, the United States strongly supported Bosch and the PRD as enlightened reformers; in 1965 the United States opposed their return to power on the unsubstantiated ground that a Bosch or PRD government would certainly, or almost certainly, become Communist dominated. Thus the United States turned its back on social revolution in Santo Domingo and associated itself with a corrupt and reactionary military oligarchy.

Fifth. U.S. policy was marred by a lack of candor and by misinformation. The former is illustrated by official assertions that U.S. military intervention was primarily for the purpose of saving American lives; the latter is illustrated by exaggerated reports of massacres and atrocities by the rebels—reports which no one has been able to verify. It was officially asserted, for example—by the President in a press conference on June 17 according to an official State Department bulletin—that "some 1,500 innocent people were murdered and shot, and their heads cut off." There is no evidence to support this statement. A sober examination of such evidence as is available indicates that the Imbert junta was guilty of at least as many atrocities as the rebels.

Sixth. Responsibility for the failure of American policy in Santo Domingo lies primarily with those who advised the President. In the critical days between April 25 and April 28, these officials sent the President exaggerated reports of the danger of a Communist takeover in Santo Domingo and, on the basis of these, recommended U.S. massive military intervention. It is not at all difficult to understand why, on the basis of such advice, the President made the decisions that he made.

Seventh. Underlying the bad advice and unwise actions of the United States was the fear of another Cuba. The specter of a second Communist state in the

Western Hemisphere—and its probable repercussions within the United States and possible effects on the careers of those who might be held responsible—seems to have been the most important single factor in distorting the judgment of otherwise sensible and competent men.

I turn now to some broader and long-term implications of the Dominican tragedy, first to some considerations relating to the Organization of American States and its charter, then to the problem of reaction and revolution in Latin America, finally to a suggestion for a freer and, I believe, healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America.

Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American States says that:

No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.

Article 17 states that:

The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever.

These clauses are not ambiguous. They mean that, with one exception to be noted, all forms of forcible intervention are absolutely prohibited among the American States. It may be that we should never have accepted this commitment at Bogotá in 1948; it is obvious from all the talk one hears these days about the obsolescence of the principle of nonintervention that some U.S. officials regret our commitment to it. The fact remains that we are committed to it, not partially or temporarily or insofar as we find it compatible with our vital interests but almost absolutely. It represents our word and our bond and our willingness to honor the solemn commitments embodied in a treaty which was ratified by the Senate on August 28, 1950.

There are those who might concede the point of law but who would also argue that such considerations have to do with our ideals rather than our interests and are therefore of secondary importance. I do not believe that is true. We are currently fighting a war in Vietnam, largely, we are told, because it would be a disaster if the United States failed to honor its word and its commitment; the matter, we are told, is one of vital national interest. I do not see why it is any less a matter of vital interest to honor a clear and explicit treaty obligation in the Americas than it is to honor the much more ambiguous and less formal promises we have made to the South Vietnamese.

The sole exception to the prohibitions of articles 15 and 17 is spelled out in article 19 of the OAS Charter, which states that "measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in articles 15 and 17." Article 6 of the Rio Treaty states:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political in-

dependence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extracontinental or intracontinental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the continent.

The United States thus had legal recourse when the Dominican crisis broke on April 24, 1965. We could have called an urgent session of the Council of the OAS for the purpose of invoking article 6 of the Rio Treaty. But we did not do so. The administration has argued that there was no time to consult the OAS, although there was time to consult—or inform—the congressional leadership. The United States thus intervened in the Dominican Republic unilaterally—and illegally.

Advising the Latin American countries of our action after the fact did not constitute compliance with the OAS Charter or the Rio Treaty; nor, indeed, would advising them before the fact have constituted compliance. One does not comply with the law by notifying interested parties in advance of one's intent to violate it. Inter-American law requires consultation for the purpose of shaping a collective decision. Only on the basis of advance consultation and agreement could we have undertaken a legal intervention in the Dominican Republic.

It is possible, had we undertaken such consultations, that our Latin American partners would have delayed a decision; it is possible that they would have refused to authorize collective intervention. My own feeling is that the situation in any case did not justify military intervention except for the limited purpose of evacuating U.S. citizens and other foreigners, but even if it seemed to us that it did, we should not have undertaken it without the advance consent of our Latin American allies. We should not have done so because the word and the honor of the United States were at stake just as much—at least as much—in the Dominican crisis as they are in Vietnam and Korea and Berlin and all the places around the globe which we have committed ourselves to defend.

There is another important reason for compliance with the law. The United States is a conservative power in the world in the sense that most of its vital interests are served by stability and order. Law is the essential foundation of stability and order both within societies and in international relations. A great conference is taking place here in Washington this week on the subject, World Peace Through Law. As a conservative power the United States has a vital interest in upholding and expanding the reign of law in international relations. Insofar as international law is observed, it provides us with stability and order and with a means of predicting the behavior of those with whom we have reciprocal legal obligations. When we

violate the law ourselves, whatever short term advantage may be gained, we are obviously encouraging others to violate the law; we thus encourage disorder and instability and thereby do incalculable damage to our own long term interests.

There are those who defend U.S. unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic on the ground that the principle of nonintervention as spelled out in the OAS Charter is obsolete. The argument is unfortunate on two grounds. First, the contention of obsolescence justifies an effort to bring about changes in the OAS Charter by due process of law, but it does not justify violation of the Charter. Second, the view that the principle of nonintervention is obsolete is one held by certain U.S. officials; most Latin Americans would argue that, far from being obsolete, the principle of nonintervention was and remains the heart and core of the Inter-American system. Insofar as it is honored, it provided them with something that many in the United States find it hard to believe they could suppose they need: protection from the United States.

Many North Americans seem to believe that, while the United States does indeed participate in Latin American affairs from time to time, sometimes by force, it is done with the best of intentions, usually indeed to protect the Latin Americans from intervention by somebody else, and therefore cannot really be considered intervention. The trouble with this point of view is that it is not shared by our neighbors to the south. Most of them do think they need protection from the United States and the history of the Monroe Doctrine and the "Roosevelt corollary" suggest that their fears are not entirely without foundation. "Good intentions" are not a very sound basis for judging the fulfillment of contractual obligations. Just about everybody, including the Communists, believes in his own "good intentions." It is a highly subjective criterion of national behavior and has no more than a chance relationship to good results. With whatever justice or lack of it, many Latin Americans are afraid of the United States; however much it may hurt our feelings, they prefer to have their security based on some more objective standard than the good intentions of the United States.

The standard on which they rely most heavily is the principle of nonintervention; however obsolete it may seem to certain U.S. officials, it remains vital and pertinent in Latin America. When we violate it, we are not overriding the mere letter of the law; we are violating what to Latin Americans is its vital heart and core.

The inter-American system is rooted in an implicit contract between the Latin American countries and the United States. In return for our promise not to interfere in their internal affairs they have accepted a role as members of our "sphere" and to support, or at least not to obstruct, our global policies. In the Dominican Republic we violated our part of the bargain; it remains to be seen whether Latin Americans will now feel free to violate theirs.

In the eyes of educated, energetic and patriotic young Latin Americans—which is to say, the generation that will make or break the Alliance for Progress—the United States committed a worse offense in the Dominican Republic than just intervention; it intervened against social revolution and in support, at least temporarily, of a corrupt, reactionary military oligarchy.

It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the United States on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. Nor am I reassured by assertions on the part of administration officials that a number of Latin American governments have secretly expressed sympathy for our actions in the Dominican Republic while explaining that of course they could not be expected to support us openly. Why cannot they support us openly, unless it is because their sympathy does not represent the views of their own people and they do not dare to express it openly? In fact, real enthusiasm for our Dominican venture has been confined largely to military dictators and ruling oligarchies.

The tragedy of Santo Domingo is that a policy that purported to defeat communism in the short run is more likely to have the effect of promoting it in the long run. Intervention in the Dominican Republic has alienated—temporarily or permanently, depending on our future policies—our real friends in Latin America. These, broadly, are the people of the democratic left—the Christian and social democrats in a number of countries, the APRA Party in Peru, the Accion Democratica Party in Venezuela, and their kindred spirits throughout the hemisphere. By our intervention on the side of a corrupt military oligarchy in the Dominican Republic, we have embarrassed before their own people the democratic reformers who have counseled trust and partnership with the United States. We have lent credence to the idea that the United States is the enemy of social revolution in Latin America and that the only choice Latin Americans have is between communism and reaction.

If those are the available alternatives, if there is no democratic left as a third option, then there is no doubt of the choice that honest and patriotic Latin Americans will make: they will choose communism, not because they want it but because U.S. policy will have foreclosed all other avenues of social revolution and, indeed, all other possibilities except the perpetuation of rule by military juntas and economic oligarchies.

The dominant force in Latin America is the aspiration of increasing numbers of people to personal and national dignity. In the minds of the rising generation there are two principle threats to that aspiration—reaction at home and domination from abroad. As a result of its Dominican actions the United States has allowed itself to become associated with both. We have thereby offended the dignity and self-respect of young and idealistic Latin Americans who must now wonder whether the United States will one day intervene against social revolu-

tions in their own countries, whether one day they will find themselves facing U.S. marines across barricades in their own home towns.

I, myself, am sure, as I know President Johnson and, indeed, most U.S. citizens are sure, that our country is not now and will not become the enemy of social revolution in Latin America. We have made a mistake in the Dominican Republic, as we did at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, but a single misjudgment does not constitute a doctrine for the conduct of future policy and we remain dedicated to the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

We know this ourselves but it remains to convince our true friends in Latin America that their social revolutions will have our sympathy and support. It will not be easy to do so, because our intervention in Santo Domingo shook if it did not shatter a confidence in the United States that had been built up over 30 years since the liquidation of the Caribbean protectorates and the initiation of the "good neighbor policy."

It will be difficult but it can be done. President Johnson took a positive step on the long road back in his statement of rededication to the Alliance for Progress to the Latin American Ambassadors on August 17. It remains for us to eliminate the ambiguity between the anti-revolutionary approach symbolized by Project Camelot and the preoccupation with problems of counterinsurgency on the one hand and the creative approach of the Alliance for Progress on the other. If we do this—and I am both sure that we can and reasonably hopeful that we will—then I think that the Dominican affair will be relegated in history to the status of a single unhappy episode on the long road toward the forging of a new and creative and dignified relationship between the United States and Latin America.

In conclusion, I suggest that a new and healthier relationship between the United States and Latin America must be a freer relationship than that of the past.

The United States is a world power with world responsibilities and to it the inter-American system represents a sensible way of maintaining law and order in the region closest to the United States. To the extent that it functions as we want it to function, one of the inter-American system's important advantages is that it stabilizes relations within the western hemisphere and thus frees the United States to act on its worldwide responsibilities.

To Latin Americans, on the other hand, the inter-American system is politically and psychologically confining. It has the effect, so to speak, of cooping them up in the western hemisphere, giving them the feeling that there is no way to break out of the usually well-intentioned but often stifling embrace of the United States. In their hearts, I have no doubt, most Latin Americans would like to be free of us, just as a son or daughter coming of age wishes to be free of an over-protective parent. A great many of those Latin Americans for

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whom Castro still has some appeal—and there are now more, I would guess, than before last April 28—are attracted not, I feel, because they are infatuated with communism, but because Cuba, albeit at the price of almost complete dependency on the Soviet Union, has broken out of the orbit of the United States.

It is the nature of things that small nations do not live comfortably in the shadow of large and powerful nations, regardless of whether the latter are benevolent or overbearing. Belgium has always been uncomfortable about Germany and France; Ireland has never been able to work up much affection for Great Britain. And in recent years some of the Eastern European governments have demonstrated that, despite the Communist ideology which they share with the Soviet Union, they still wish to free themselves as much as they can and as much as they dare from the overbearing power of Russia. It is natural and inevitable that Latin American countries should have some of the same feelings toward the United States.

Perhaps, then, the foremost immediate requirement for a new and more friendly relationship between Latin America and the United States in the long run is not closer ties and new institutional bonds but a loosening of existing ties and institutional bonds. It is an established psychological principle—or, for that matter, just common sense—that the strongest and most viable personal bonds are those which are voluntary, a voluntary bond being, by definition, an arrangement which one is free to enter or not to enter. I do not see why the same principle should not operate in relations between nations. If it does, it would follow that the first step toward stronger ties between Latin America and the United States would be the creation of a situation in which Latin American countries would be free, and would feel free, to maintain or sever existing ties as they see fit and, perhaps more important, to establish new arrangements, both among themselves and with nations outside the hemisphere, in which the United States would not participate.

President Frei of Chile has taken an initiative to this end. He has visited European leaders and apparently indicated that his Christian Democratic Government is interested in establishing new political, economic, and cultural links with European countries. For the reasons suggested, I think this is an intelligent and constructive step.

I think further that it would be a fine thing if Latin American countries were to undertake a program of their own for "building bridges" to the world beyond the western hemisphere—to Europe and Asia and Africa, and to the Communist countries if they wish. Such relationships, to be sure, would involve a loosening of ties to the United States in the immediate future, but in the long run, I feel sure, they would make for both happier and stronger bonds with the United States—happier because they would be free, stronger because they would be dignified and self-respecting as they never had been before.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should like to express my complete accord with the position taken by the Senator in his most interesting and very important speech about the Dominican Republic and the events which have taken place there.

It has been my privilege as a junior member of the Committee on Foreign Relations to sit through most of the hearings which have been held on the Dominican Republic and to read that part of the testimony which I did not actually hear.

I believe that this speech is overdue, sound, and wise. I hope that it will be given great effect by the policymakers of the executive branch of our Government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator very much for his comment.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas is certainly entitled to his opinion with regard to the action of the President of the United States, as are all Senators. However, I should like to say as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I do not believe the Senator from Arkansas' remarks reflect the sentiment of that committee on this matter. The members of the committee were invited by the President to give him advice on the decision to send American troops to the Dominican Republic. That is true of the distinguished chairman of the committee also. When that decision was made, not one dissenting voice was heard. The Senator was there. He had an opportunity to advise the President about what should be done. I believe his advice was taken on that occasion.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is mistaken. We were not asked as to what action should be taken. We were told what had been done. As far as we knew, it had been done.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is not my impression. My impression is that the Senator attended the meeting at the White House. He was there. I know I was there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was there.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Not one American marine had been landed up to that time.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the decision had been made.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I am not going to quote the Senator because that was a secret meeting and much secret information was discussed.

My understanding was that the President—and I say this with regard to our Republican friends also—said certain things to indicate that he did not want to act until he had consulted with us; and the decision had not been made.

My impression of the matter was that the Senator from Arkansas made a suggestion of what should be done. He can use his best judgment on the protocol about matters of that sort. But my impression was, insofar as the Senator's suggestion, was concerned that it was followed.

So far as I am concerned, this was simply a matter of whether this country was going to stand aside and risk another Cuban type Communist takeover, or whether we were going to move on the theory that this looked very much as though it might be a Communist takeover, and that we would rather take the chance of moving when it might not be necessary, than take the risk—as President Eisenhower did—that this would be a Communist takeover.

We have information now that the Communists in the Dominican Republic are stronger than Castro was when he started out to take Cuba.

We have information, available to the Senator from Arkansas, to lead us to believe there is a real threat of Communist subjugation and conquest of that island. That we do not wish to see take place.

I have heard some criticism of the fact that the President sent more troops than were necessary. In Louisiana we had some contact with this type of problem.

I recall a time, while my father was a prominent official in Louisiana government, when some people who could not win an election decided to take charge and organized an army at the airport. The National Guard arrived and the only fellow who was injured was a man who shot himself with his own shotgun trying to get through a barbed wire fence.

At another time, in the city of New Orleans, when the police force was under control of the existing organization, which was opposed to our group and would not assure our faction an honest election count, we called out the National Guard. After awhile we agreed on a procedure to assure a fair election and we took out the National Guard. We got an honest count.

On both occasions the man in charge of the troops did not have to shoot anybody, but he said:

The best way to be sure you do not have to fight is to have enough troops there so the opposition will know that they cannot defeat you if there is to be fighting.

That would be my advice to the President. "Do not send 200 or 300 marines and have them exterminated. Send enough boys so that if there is a fight, and the opposition will know that if they start a fight, they will be defeated."

The Senator had a different idea than I did in regard to the Bay of Pigs. My thought about the Bay of Pigs was that the idea of helping people to go there and liberating that island was not a bad idea. The only thing was that we did not send enough people to whip Castro.

If that were to have been done, that would have been the time to do it, in my judgment. Many people would like to be free of Castro's enslavement on that island. If the general philosophy of the Senator's speech had been followed, Castro would have taken not only that island, but the Dominican Republic, also.

If we follow the general view that if the Communists attempt to take over, we ought to do what is within our power to keep that from happening, not only would we not have lost the Dominican

Republic to the Communists; we would never have lost Cuba to the Communists.

Suppose President Eisenhower had it to do all over again, and he had heard one group argue the Fulbright doctrine: "Do not interfere; you might be criticized"; and another group saying, "This is a Communist takeover; go on in." Suppose President Eisenhower, sincere, anti-Communist, and good man that he is, had been confronted with such a situation again.

I believe he would not have taken a chance that there would be a Communist takeover. He would have gone in. He would have resolved the doubt in an effort to try to save the people from Communist subjugation.

So far as I know—and I believe this is correct—every responsible person who had any contact with the matter urged the President to do what he did; and the President proceeded to do what he thought was best, after explaining the problem as he saw it. He invited everyone, including the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT], to offer advice. I had the opportunity to offer my advice. My advice was: "If you have any thought whatever that this might be a Communist takeover, please, Mr. President, move, because the American people will never forgive you if you merely sit here and watch the Communists take that island."

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. I want to associate myself with the remarks just made by the distinguished Senator from Louisiana. I am one of those who was privileged to sit in on the particular meeting that has been referred to. There were many there from both sides of the aisle. As I recall, the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DRANKEN] was present, as, of course, was the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. FULBRIGHT]. I believe the overwhelming consensus was that we wanted to be certain that the island of the Dominican Republic was not lost to the Communists. No one was absolutely certain as to what was happening. At this point there was no time for a study by the Foreign Relations Committee or any other committee. The country was on fire; people were dying; property was being destroyed; Communists were on hand and chaos was in charge. Something had to be done and it had to be done based on the best information then available. The President was told by our Ambassador, by the representatives of the CIA, the Peace Corps, the USIA, and the Air Force, the Army, the Marines, and the Navy. All spoke with a loud and unanimous voice—and they said, "the revolution has been going on for 4 days—it is now out of hand and you Mr. President must send in troops to save lives and property." It was very clear that at the White House, at that time that the overwhelming consensus was of the belief that we had better send in enough forces to make certain that the indiscriminate shooting and looting would be stopped, and that the Commu-

nists would not take over. I do not agree that too many troops were sent into the Dominican Republic. For that matter, I do not believe we are sending too many troops to Vietnam. If one argued the same philosophy as that expressed by the Senator from Arkansas, perhaps he could say we are sending too many troops to Vietnam, because we are now beginning to win there.

Surely no one would argue that we are not supposed to win just because we are opposing Communists, and some misled liberals who are on their side. We are fighting Communists in Vietnam. We are having to oppose them—one way or another, all around the world, and for a certainty they sought to take over the Dominican Republic just as they did Cuba, and that was a matter of grave concern to us when the President sent in our troops to Santo Domingo. I do not see anything wrong with that, as the distinguished Senator from Louisiana has indicated. What is wrong with trying to save a country from communism?

We had already lost Cuba to Castro. It has been admitted that there were only about 12 known Communist leaders in Cuba with Castro when he started his revolution. He was acclaimed—when he started out—the greatest social revolutionary to come along in modern day. I remember when the New York Times and other newspapers were writing lyrical articles about Castro and what a great man he was. I recall his appearance before the American Society of Newspaper Publishers and Editors, where he was lauded and applauded. I also recall when he sat with the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Capitol and I asked him, "When are you going to have elections?"

Castro replied, "There is no use in having elections, because I will be elected over and over again."

Castro made that statement in the Committee on Foreign Relations, and still many thought he was a great democratic leader. Castro proved that it was not necessary to have a large number of Communists present in order to deliver a country to communism. When a country like Cuba falls to communism it costs us hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. So we could not afford to take a chance in the Dominican Republic.

I do not understand the philosophy of the Senator from Arkansas in this respect. I have the greatest affection and highest respect for my former chairman, the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], but I do not understand, for the life of me, what the objection is to sending enough troops to the Dominican Republic to do the job, or even perhaps sending 200 or 300 more. The job was done. The country has not been lost. It is today moving in the direction of establishing a constitutional government, so that, hopefully, constitutional rights will be in the near future preserved.

I again totally associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, if it could be done as the Senator from Arkansas proposes, I would much prefer to treat the Communists with

Christian fellowship, love, and truth, without having to resort to violence. A number of fine people, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, used that approach, but did not get fair with it. If we are to keep the Communists from taking over, we cannot rely on them to tell the truth; we cannot rely on them to admit that they are Communists; we cannot rely on their regime not to murder and exterminate people who do not agree with communism.

I would be willing to take a chance on meeting Communists in free elections. Why will they not agree to free elections? They will not agree to them here or anywhere else. About the only time Communists are willing to agree to free elections is when the Communists cannot win by force of arms nor by blackmail, assassination, or brutality. They have yet to win their first free election.

A program of good will, kindness, truth, and love they neighbor, while it is fine to be extended toward Communists, is never seen coming from the opposite direction, toward us.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, to try to keep the record straight—and it was not my intention to engage in a general, running debate on how much we disagree with communism—I assure the Senator from Louisiana that I am not a Communist and do not wish to promote that system.

The policies I am talking about involve a judgment as to whether they do or do not promote communism.

The only election in the Dominican Republic that we are told was absolutely free and without any threat, was the one that resulted in the election of Mr. Bosch. But he was thrown out by a coup.

The Senator from Louisiana is saying that the whole movement of U.S. troops was to prevent Communists from taking over. At the meeting at the White House it is my impression—and I believe the press reports will confirm it—that we were told that the movement was to save American lives. Much was said about the saving of 1,500 American lives and several hundred other lives. It was put on the basis of saving innocent people, particularly Americans and the nationals of other countries. I said in my speech that I thoroughly agreed with that proposal.

When a situation endangers the lives of people who had nothing to do with the occurrence, it is quite proper for us to act. That was the theory on which our action was based at the meeting. We were not told that a Communist takeover was in progress.

I recall asking—and perhaps someone else asked—what the situation was with respect to communism. We were told that three individuals had been identified as Communists. This is out of several thousand who were engaged in the uprising.

I must say this in all charity to the Director of the CIA, who had been sworn in that very noon, so he could not have been expected to know what had taken place. He had been the Director of the CIA only about 10 hours, perhaps 6 hours. I do not blame him at all for either inadvertence or anything else. About a

week later, after the situation had been reviewed, it was announced that 55 persons were Communists.

No one believed that Rafael Molina Urena was a Communist. He had been the President of the Senate under the Bosch regime. Under their Constitution, as I understand it, since Bosch did not return, Molina was what we would consider to be the legitimate successor. I understand that that was the process of succession. He was designated by the party in power, the PRD Party, which is the only legitimate party which had won an election, by 58 percent, in 1962. The party was thrown out by a coup, as the Senator knows.

This was an effort to reestablish themselves. The leaders of this revolution were not accused of being Communists. The Senator is assuming the very fact in controversy. The very fact that I question is that there was any firm and convincing evidence that this was a Communist takeover, that the revolutionary power, the revolutionary movement was dominated and controlled by Communists.

We had 13 meetings on this matter. To me, there is very little evidence from the testimony of administration witnesses. Every witness was an administration witness except Muñoz-Marin, who is certainly no enemy of the administration. He has been a very close friend of this administration. As the Senator knows, he was a long-time Governor of Puerto Rico. There was no serious and convincing evidence, or even anything close to being convincing evidence, that the leaders of the revolution in the beginning were Communists. They were members of the PRD Party. They were people who wished to reaffirm their claim to the presidency. They had been thrown out by a coup.

The Senator assumes that this was a Communist takeover.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I decline to yield further.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I raised the point in my speech that there was not any evidence to show that it was a Communist plot. I think that it was more likely a PRD revolution.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator has failed to distinguish between non-Communist liberals who were involved there and the hard-core Castro-trained Communists who were trained to take over. When Castro took over Cuba, knowing the experience we have had if we had followed the Fulbright doctrine, the takeover would have occurred nevertheless, because many sincere liberals were opposed to Batista while hard-core Communists were prepared to kill the Socialist or non-Communist liberals and take the place over.

That is what they did and they did it as quickly as these honest and sincere people who believed in freedom discovered that they had made a mistake and fallen into a trap. The people discovered that it was then too late. They could not extricate themselves. Some of those people gave up their lives and were injured and taken prisoners at the Bay of Pigs invasion when they tried to liberate Cuba from Castro.

We had enough information to know that the Dominican revolt was a move in the direction of communism. This country had all the justification that it needed to intervene. It had sufficient justification to require our going in there and protecting our citizens and the citizens of other countries.

Oddly enough, De Gaulle can find more reason to criticize our country, a country which has defended France more than any other country, than any man who has ever had a position of great responsibility and power in the free world.

Mr. de Gaulle found fault with the United States sending troops to a country to protect human life. However, De Gaulle's Ambassador rushed down and asked that the French Embassy be protected by American troops against irresponsible revolutionaries who were running down the corridors with machine-guns and killing people. We took it upon ourselves to protect innocent people from friendly nations, people who were not a party to the revolt at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is no question about that.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. The Senator suggests something that is inconsistent, with respect to this Nation contributing troops in this situation. We did not do it when Mr. Bosch was run out of there.

As a practical matter, the President was right in taking the position which he did in the military coup which involved Mr. Bosch. It was a fight between one crowd of anti-Communists and another crowd. I do not believe that we would have had any right to go in there with troops at that time. However, on the other hand, if this were a Communist takeover, or if it had the possibility of being a Communist takeover, if we had the information, which we did, that a great many hard-core Communist Moscow-trained or Castro-trained Communists were in there seeking to start a revolution and to take charge and take over the country, we should have attempted to frustrate that effort if we could.

I believe the record shows that every person whose advice the President sought on Capitol Hill, be he Republican or Democrat—and if any Senator wants to question this statement, he can say so—either advised the President to go or did not advise him not to go.

I believe that every single person advised the President to go, with the exception of the suggestion made by the Senator from Arkansas, and, to the best of my knowledge, the President followed that advice.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, the Senator from Arkansas talks about his recollection with regard to how many Communists we thought were in Santo Domingo. It was all a guess. My recollection is that it was approximately 58. And the 58 were Communist leaders. Actually nobody had any idea for a certainty how many Communists were there or how many of the revolutionists were on the Communist side.

At the time that Bosch was thrown out

by internal revolution, I do not believe that anybody advised the then President of the United States that our people were being fired on and that our property was being destroyed, nor that we should send troops. I do not believe that the then Ambassador, nor the Army, nor the Navy, nor the CIA, nor the Peace Corps gave such advice. I do not believe that any of the people who, on this April 1965 occasion, advised the President that we needed troops there to protect our property and the lives of people, advised that we should send troops on that other occasion. When Bosch was forced by a coup to leave Santo Domingo and move to Puerto Rico.

I believe that it might be said about that meeting at the White House to which we have been making reference, and I do not believe this will violate to any great extent the rules with regard to keeping such meetings secret—that everybody who was there recalls that when the President was advising us as to what he was going to do—a telephone call came through, the fellow who was talking from the Dominican Republic said that he was at that moment under the table and the bullets were coming through the window and surging all around him.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Bullets were whizzing through the window of the Embassy by the Ambassador.

Mr. SMATHERS. The Senator is correct. At the very moment of the telephone conversation, bullets were coming through the window. What is the President supposed to say—"Let us go out and reason with these people?" This was no time to reason. These people were not in a reasoning mood. Something had to be done, and the President was advised to take a firm and courageous course and he took it.

At that time, we thought that some 1,560 people were killed in the first few days. Remember the President did not send our troops until the revolution had been going on for 4 days. Everybody's hindsight is better than their foresight. It may be that there were not 1,560 people killed. However, many of them were killed, and millions of dollars worth of property was destroyed. Our Embassy was being fired upon. Other embassies were being looted. Thank God our troops finally showed up.

The Senator from Louisiana has pointed out that by virtue of the fact that we had our troops down there, some 5,600 people, nationals of other countries, were safely evacuated. Because of the presence of our troops, there was no great loss of life.

If we had delayed; if we had had a study; if the President had vacillated, hundreds and hundreds of other people would have been killed and untold damage would have been done. But most importantly that country would be in the hands of the Communists today.

One of the significant things that is never talked about when we discuss this Dominican matter is the Organization of American States. At its fourth inter-parliamentary session—in the official meetings or consultations, the Organization of American States directed that one of their groups go to Santo Domingo

and make a study. These are Latin people, not from the United States—but from various countries of Latin America. The official OAS group concluded that the President of the United States did the only sensible and practical thing that could have been done under the circumstances, when he dispatched troops to restore law and order.

I repeat these are Latins, familiar with the area, the conditions, the people. They approved the President's action. It seems to me that what we ought to be doing is applauding the President. Thank God that most of the people are doing that. The Gallup poll shows that 85 percent of the people approve of what the President did in Santo Domingo. I believe that those people who approve of the action of the President are correct. And I believe a majority of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and a majority of this Senate believe our President acted correctly and courageously.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, the President had the advice of a nine-man American team in Santo Domingo. The team included those who had responsibility, anybody in charge of any organization, from the Peace Corps up to the Ambassador himself. He had the advice of the State Department, and the advice of his own White House staff, which is supposed to be available to him for such purpose. Some reference was made to the fact that the man from the CIA had only been there a short time. But that man was a naval admiral, and he was not merely saying what he learned in 5 days; he was giving the best judgment he could based on the advice of experts who have been studying such problems for many years.

If those who had responsibility to tell us how to deal with the Communists in Santo Domingo, and how to deal with the Communists in the Dominican Republic, and all those people, so far as I know unanimously—and the record will show—provided such advice to the President, who would say that should be done?

The Senator said when he was there that perhaps he did not advise us not to go because he thought the decision had been made. That is my understanding. My understanding is that the President had taken the precaution to do what he should have done, that is, to put the carriers in a position so that he would have the troops available if the decision was made to go in.

Now he has been criticized for going in with too much. I suppose next year he will be criticized for going too soon.

But if we were compelled to move, I would want to be able to avoid a complete Communist takeover. If we had to go in, it was better to go with too much too soon than to go with too little too late.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of what the record shows, I based my speech upon the records of the hearings before the committee. Many wild rumors were published in the newspapers which our own people did not confirm. For ex-

ample, the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] says 1,560 were killed in the first 4 days.

As of May 8, the Red Cross confirmed a count of 150 dead and 605 wounded in hostilities. They were not Americans. No American citizens was killed or shot or injured until after the Marines were landed and the Marines exchanged shots with the revolutionists.

So subsequent events did not confirm the advice about the necessity and the danger that came from the Embassy.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, who has the floor?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana has the floor at this moment, unless he will yield for a parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I have not yielded, Mr. President. I wish to make this statement, and I will try to cut it short.

I know the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] has a responsibility to the Senate. He is trying to discharge it. I shall try to cooperate with him.

It is one thing to think about these matters, ask for hearings, bring people in, see what the record shows, and take a nice vacation and analyze the matter, and come back in a week and say, "I am not sure this was necessary at all."

But it is quite another thing if the man is there, and shooting is going on, and he must move now or it will be too late. He cannot stop to figure whether 315 or 575 or 1,500 people have been killed. He must move now.

It is easy to find fault with the President of the United States. Senators have, and I am sure they will continue to do so.

But one thing we cannot say about the man who is President of the United States: We cannot say he cannot move. I say to the Senate that when hurricane Betsy hit Louisiana last week, the worst disaster in our history, I called the President and said, "Mr. President, the most horrible thing that has ever happened to Louisiana has just occurred. The people ought to see you and know that their Government and their President are interested in their welfare. It will give them the courage to try to hold out and try to help themselves, if they just know that help is on its way, and that they have this great country on their side."

That man has on his hands the war in Vietnam, but he called me and said, "Be at the White House in 15 minutes. If you are not at the White House in 15 minutes, I will be on my way to Louisiana by myself." I got there and we went down there, and he told those people that all of the red tape would be cut, and that help was on its way.

We are getting help. If I had to choose between one man who thinks it might not be all that serious, and says, "Let us wait and get the report and analyze it and think about it a little longer," and the man who says, "Wait a minute; if we do all this, it might be

too late," I think I would take the fellow who could move.

Many battles have been lost by waiting to see. The South would be a separate nation today—and I am glad we are not—had it not been that a citizen of Louisiana, Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard, waited until the smoke lifted on the first day of the Battle of Shiloh, down in Tennessee.

Had that man had the aggressive instincts of our President, he would have pushed Grant's army into the Tennessee River before General Buell was able to bring up a whole new Federal Army to join the fight. On that occasion, Albert Sidney Johnson had bled to death in his saddle pressing the attack. When Johnson died, and Beauregard found himself in command, he preferred to halt the attack and renew it on the following day. By that time Beauregard was facing two Union armies instead of one.

Had Beauregard possessed the initiative of our President, he would have run the Union Army into the river on the evening of the first day, and instead of Grant defeating the Southern Army, and proceeding to capture one army at Vicksburg and another at Appomattox, Grant would have been relieved of duty as an incompetent, and Lincoln would have never found himself a great general.

But, Mr. President, we have a President who moved. He moved in the tradition of our great country, and in the tradition of all great Americans, who do not believe in waiting until the smoke lifts in Santo Domingo or until the dust settles in China to do something about these things. Mr. President, I thank the merciful Lord that our President possesses a sense of urgency and that he possesses initiative.

I yield the floor.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, the Senator from West Virginia will cooperate, as always, with his colleagues. He knows that the subject matter which has been discussed is important. As the assistant majority leader has stated, legislation is pending in the Chamber. It, too, deals with important subject matter of concern to the American people.

I ask unanimous consent, however, that the Senator from Delaware be permitted to address the Senators on a subject which is not germane.

Mr. ROBERTSON. How long does the Senator from Delaware wish to hold the floor?

Mr. RANDOLPH. Approximately 10 minutes. He talked with me about an hour and a half ago about his request. At that time, we did not know that the Senator from Arkansas and the Senator from Louisiana would take as much time as they have taken.

I, too, wish to go forward with the pending legislation, but I feel that I at least implied to the Senator from Delaware that I would submit this unanimous-consent request, and I do so with the understanding that he speak not more than 10 minutes.

Mr. ROBERTSON. With that understanding I shall not object, but I hope after that we may proceed with the bill, because it is not a minor bill.

Mr. RANDOLPH. I agree with the Senator from Virginia, and for that reason, very frankly, I hope Senators will not discuss this nongermane subject.

I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Delaware be permitted to speak.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the request of the Senator from West Virginia include any time limitation? The Chair is asking for information.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. No.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator make any request as to retention of the floor?

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. No; I do not do that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? None is heard, and it is so ordered.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Before I proceed, I understand that there is no time limitation; is that correct?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I shall be brief. As I told the Senator from West Virginia I would not want a time limitation. I appreciate the fact that there is an important bill before the Senate, and I appreciate the fact that he wishes to proceed to discuss it.

I point out, however, that there is nothing world shaking in the bill. I tried to obtain a copy of it this morning as late as 10 o'clock, and it had not even come back from the printer, which shows how fast we are moving. It is about a \$320 million bill which is before the Senate for consideration. It had not even been printed until about an hour ago, and certainly the Texas steam roller, even under the Great Society, can slow down that long.

I am correct, then, in my understanding that there is no time limitation as far as I am concerned; however, I assure the Senators that I shall take no longer than necessary.

NOMINATION OF DAVID BRESS TO BE DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, the nomination of Mr. David Bress to fill the vacancy as district attorney for the District of Washington, D.C., has been submitted to the Senate.

I do not know Mr. Bress. He may be a very able man. He may be a man of the greatest integrity; however, in the light of the past position which Mr. Bress had as one of the attorneys for Bobby Baker's vending company, it is not proper that he be appointed at this time as the U.S. attorney in Washington, D.C.

It is common knowledge that a Federal grand jury is at work in the District of Columbia on the affairs of Mr. Robert G. Baker. Although Mr. Bress might disassociate himself from the work of the Baker grand jury, I do not believe this is enough. There must be an investigation that is thorough and aggressive and one that appears to be thorough and aggressive in every respect.

It is not only important that the investigation be honest; it is equally important that the investigation gives the appearance of being honest.

The public must be shown that Bobby Baker and his kind will be investigated and prosecuted in the same manner as any other influence peddlers. The appearances are particularly important in the Baker case because of his former influential position as Secretary to the Democratic majority in the Senate and because of his past associations with some of the highest public figures in this Nation.

The public must be shown that there is no double standard of justice by which the Bobby Bakers are shielded by friends in the Senate, investigated by friendly U.S. attorneys, or brought before courts stacked with his political cronies.

The attempted whitewash of the Baker case by the Democratic majority of the Rules Committee has disillusioned many citizens. This Nation needs assurance that the whitewashing is ended in this Baker matter. The nomination of Mr. Bress does little to restore confidence in the Johnson administration. Instead it can only be interpreted as a continuation of the efforts to protect Bobby Baker and keep a tight lid on the whole Baker operation.

If the administration did not know that Mr. Bress represented Serv-U in the civil suit that launched the Baker matter, then the administration was lax in its preliminary study in making this nomination.

If the facts were known by the President and others then the nomination can be regarded as an arrogant disregard for normal ethical sensitivity and for public opinion.

If a lawyer for the Teamsters Union were named as U.S. attorney or judge in an area where Mr. Hoffa was under investigation it would be regarded as shocking. I consider it no less shocking when an influence peddler, such as Mr. Baker has been proven to be, ends up with so many friends in court. I hope it is carelessness. I hope there are no callous efforts to stack the deck.

This nomination should be withdrawn by the administration.

If it is not the Senate should hold it up until after the whole Baker investigation and prosecution is disposed of.

Mr. President, yesterday, in response to a suggestion concerning the advisability of having his nomination either withdrawn or held up until after the Baker case had been disposed of, Mr. Bress is quoted as having said that while he admitted he was the attorney for the Serv-U Corp. he was not aware that Mr. Baker was a stockholder. Such an excuse is ridiculous.

As evidence that Mr. Bress did know or at least that he should have known that Mr. Baker was connected with this company I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a copy of a document filed in the district court by Mr. David G. Bress in his capacity as the attorney for the Serv-U Corp. Under date of October 22, 1963.

There being no objection, the document was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA—CAPITOL VENDING CO., INC., WASHINGTON, D.C., PLAINTIFF v. ROBERT G. BAKER, U.S. CAPITOL; FRED BLACK, JR.; ERNEST C. TUCKER, SERV-U CORP., WASHINGTON, D.C., DEFENDANTS—CIVIL ACTION No. 2249-63

(Filed October 22, 1963, Harry M. Hull, clerk.)

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT SERV-U CORP.

The defendant, Serv-U Corp., by its attorney, for its answer to the complaint says as follows:

First defense

The complaint fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted.

Second defense

1. Defendant admits the jurisdiction of this court.

2. Defendant does not have sufficient information or knowledge to either admit or deny the averments of paragraph 2.

3-5. Defendant admits the averments of paragraphs 3, 4, and 5.

6. Defendant denies that it is a corporation organized under the laws of California, but avers that it is a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware and has an office in the District of Columbia at 2000 P Street NW., Washington, D.C.

7-9. Defendant does not have sufficient information or knowledge to either admit or deny the averments of paragraphs 7, 8, and 9.

10. Defendant admits that it is engaged in the coin operated vending machine business in California and that it has contracts relating to the installation and operation of such machines in various plants in California, including certain plants of North American Aviation Corp. but this defendant denies that Robert G. Baker is a stockholder of record and is without sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny any equitable interest.

11. Defendant denies the averments relating to this defendant but has not sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny the remaining averments of paragraph 11.

12. Defendant admits that Ernest C. Tucker is a stockholder of record in defendant and that he is its chairman of the board.

13-14. Defendant does not have sufficient knowledge or information to either admit or deny the averments of paragraphs 13 and 14.

15-19. Defendant denies the averments of paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19.

Wherefore, defendant, Serv-U Corp., prays that a judgment be entered herein in its favor and that the complaint herein be dismissed with costs and that this defendant be awarded attorneys fees incurred by it herein.

DAVID G. BRESS,
Attorney for defendant,
Serv-U Corp.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, this document relates to the suit which the Capitol Vending Co. had filed against Robert G. Baker, Fred Black, Jr., Ernest C. Tucker, and the Serv-U Corp. under Civil Action No. 2249-63.

While in this document they did not admit specific knowledge that Mr. Baker was a stockholder in the Serv-U Corp., nevertheless, as an attorney for Serv-U certainly Mr. Bress was aware of the facts of life, and as specific proof that at the time this document was filed Mr. Baker was actually a stockholder of the corporation I ask unanimous consent to have Mr. Baker's financial statement of February 1, 1963, printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the document was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Robert G. Baker, Washington, D.C., statement of condition, Feb. 1, 1963

Assets	Market value of assets Feb. 1, 1963	Liabilities and net worth	Amount
Current assets:		Current liabilities:	
Cash on hand and in banks.....	\$51,000	Accounts payable.....	\$43,000
Accounts receivable.....	88,000	Mortgages payable (installments due within 1 year (schedule 2)).....	31,800
Notes receivable.....	287,000	Notes payable (banks secured by stocks (schedule 3)).....	290,000
Cash-surrender value of life insurance.....	2,000		
U.S. Government retirement reserve.....	10,000		
Stocks (schedule 1).....	1,582,630		
Total current assets.....	2,158,630	Total current liabilities.....	364,800
Fixed assets:		Fixed liabilities:	
Real estate owned (schedule 2).....	456,666	Mortgages payable (schedule 2).....	120,500
Furniture and equipment.....	5,000	Less installment due within 1 year.....	31,800
Total assets.....	2,620,296	Total, fixed liabilities.....	88,610
		Total liabilities.....	453,410
		Net worth.....	2,166,886
		Total liabilities and net worth.....	2,620,206

Real estate owned and mortgages payable, Robert G. Baker, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 1963

Description	Title in name of—	Market value, Feb. 1, 1963		Mortgages payable	
		Share owned, (percent)	Amount	Amount	Annual payment
Residence: 3324 Northampton St. NW., Washington, D.C.	Bobby G. and Dorothy C. Baker.....	100	\$35,900	\$13,000	\$1,530
1 house and 2 apartments: Blue Ridge Dr., Pickens, S.C.	Robert G. Baker and D. A. Holder.....	50	10,000	2,500	300
Entire block ocean front: 47th St. to 48th St., North Ocean City, Md.	Robert G. Baker, Gertrude and Don Novak.....	33	41,666	15,000	5,000
40 acres: Colesville Rd. Extended, Silver Spring, Md.	Don Novak and Robert G. Baker.....	50	120,000	15,000	10,000
42-unit motel: Howard Johnson, Charlotte, N.C.	Mecklenberg Enterprises.....	50	250,000	75,000	15,000
Total market value, Feb. 1, 1963.....			456,666		
Total mortgages payable (Robert Baker's share), Feb. 1, 1963.....				120,500	
Total annual payment on mortgages.....					31,890

Stocks owned, Robert G. Baker, Washington, D.C., Feb. 1, 1963

Description	Shares owned	Market value Feb. 1, 1963	Pledged as collateral
Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Co.....	15,130	\$453,900	8,835 shares with Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., Oklahoma City Okla.
Serv-U Corp. (5 times earnings).....	2,850	1,000,000	5,995 shares with First National Bank of Dallas, Dallas, Tex.
Winn Dixie.....	100	2,800	2,850 shares with Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co., Oklahoma City, Okla.
District of Columbia National Bank.....	1,500	45,000	100 shares with Suburban Trust Co., Silver Spring, Md.
Carolina Pipeline Co.....	2,500	20,000	1,500 shares with American Security & Trust Co., Washington, D.C.
First Virginia Corp.....	3,000	15,000	2,500 shares with South Carolina National Bank, Greenville, S.C.
Blue Ridge Development Corp.....	50	15,000	3,000 shares with American Security & Trust Co., Washington, D.C.
Greenville (S.C.) Memorial Gardens.....	180	10,000	
Mallikji Savings & Loan Association.....	2,500	5,000	180 shares with Pickens Bank, Pickens, S.C.
Don Reynolds Insurance Co.....	200	1,600	
Mansfield Industries.....	50	2,400	
Truck Insurance Exchange.....	48	1,680	48 shares with Suburban Trust Co., Silver Spring, Md.
Pickens Bank.....	75	2,250	75 shares with Suburban Trust Co.
National Bank of Maryland.....			
Total market value of stock Feb. 1, 1963.....		1,582,630	

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, in this financial statement Mr. Baker lists his ownership of 2,850 shares of Serv-U stock with a market valuation of \$1 million. These 2,850 shares of Serv-U stock owned by Mr. Baker were at that time being held by the Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. in Oklahoma City, Okla., as collateral for a loan which he had obtained from that bank.

Thus, Bobby Baker's ownership of Serv-U was a matter of record in February 1963, 8 months prior to the time that Mr. Bress was acting as the attorney for the Serv-U Corp.

It is utterly ridiculous for him now to claim that he did not know that Mr. Baker was the prime factor and principal stockholder in the Serv-U Corp. If, as the attorney for this corporation, he

did not know, then he is too naive for the position to which he has been nominated.

"FOOT IN MOUTH" DISEASE OF OUR STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, after spending millions of dollars the Agriculture Department was able to eradicate the foot-and-mouth disease that had been so prevalent among animals.

Perhaps we should launch a research program now to eradicate the "foot in mouth" disease of our State Department.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an editorial published in the September 2 issue of the Washington Daily News entitled "Foot in Uncle's Mouth."

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Daily News, Sept. 2, 1965]

FOOT IN UNCLE'S MOUTH

Every once in a while, somebody opens his mouth and puts his foot, not in it, but in Uncle Sam's. That hurts us all.

We don't know the exact ins and outs of the charge by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that back in 1960 a bribe of \$3 million was offered by a CIA agent and that later a letter of apology arrived from incoming Secretary of State Dean Rusk, along with a statement that the new Kennedy administration would not countenance such goings on.

We do know that both at the State Department and in Malaysia on Tuesday, U.S. spokesmen denied flatly that the incident ever occurred. And that on Wednesday, the State Department discovered the Rusk letter